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The Technical Image and Imagination 
 
“Why Do Typewriters Go ‘Click’?" 
The explanation is simple; Clicking is more easily mechanized than sliding. This 
becomes clear when cars and film projectors start to go wrong. But this example is 
inadequate. Because what lies behind the question is: Why do machines stutter? The 
answer is: Because everything there is in the world (and the whole world itself) stutters. 
This only becomes clear when one takes a closer look. Democritus already suspected it, 
but not until numbers, but not letters, correspond to the world. It is open to calculation 
but not to description. Therefore, numbers have to break out of the alphanumeric code 
and make themselves independent. Letters entice one into endless discussion about the 
world and have to be put to one side as not equal to the task. This is precisely what is 
happening. Numbers abandon the alphanumeric code in favor of new codes (the digital 
code for example) and they feed computers. Letters (if they want to survive) have to 
simulate numbers. This is why typewriters go ‘click’.1 
 
 
How does the image inform the computer? How is it that the selfie, computer 
applications such as Snapchat, home-produced Youtube videos, and other visual media 
that seem to be so quintessential to modern internet culture appear to have come out of 
nowhere? Fifteen years ago, a description of the amount of shared videos and photos by 
the individual and the collective would have sounded bizarre, and yet, they have become 
a significant component to modern life. The answer is that these new modes of 
decentralized image production did not come out of nowhere, but in fact are at least one-
hundred years in the making. Modern visual culture, which is computational and 
network-based in nature, actually has its roots in the very essence of chemical 
photography, first developed as a mass-culture product in the 19th century: “the character 
                                                
1 Flusser, Vile ́m, and Anthony Mathews. "Why Do Typewriters Go 'Click’ “The Shape of Things: A 
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of the apparatus can be discovered through an analysis of the simple camera, as if in an 
embryonic state”.2 
 The mode of thinking inspired by the photograph, as well as the subject created 
by the photographic apparatus, have been present since the camera first became available. 
More than the mechanical components of the camera, we must focus on the ethic inspired 
by the apparatus which produces technical images, that is, images created by an apparatus 
which by necessity diminishes human input. Put short: we use the camera, but the camera 
uses us as well.  
Through the work of primarily Vilem Flusser I hope to show that current visual 
culture is actually nothing more than the coalescing of the photographic ethic first 
inspired by the primitive apparatus that is the photographic camera. The truth is not that 
images are more computational today, but that there often is a misunderstanding 
surrounding the technical image in general. Technical images are primarily 
computational. The technical image is an image created by a machine, and by necessity 
the technical image excises human activity, or at least degrades it in importance.  
If we start with the chemical photo, we will realize that although there are a large 
number of possible photos, this number is in fact finite. The number of possible photos is 
determined by all of the formal elements, which can be immediately quantized: shutter 
speed, aperture, angle, focal length, and so forth. A change in just one of these formal 
elements creates a new photo, hence there is a large number of possible photos 
programmed within a camera: you can take a photo of a man holding a hat to his face 
with a 50mm lens, or with a 100mm lens, or with a 150mm lens. If you keep the same 
                                                
2 Flusser, Vilém. Towards a Philosophy of Photography. N.p.: Reaktion, 2000. 15. Print. 
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lens, you can change the shutter speed or aperture in order to create yet another set of 
possibilities. The large number of photos programmed within the camera is due to the 
immense variability contained not only within these elements, but also within framing, 
angles, and so on. But, importantly, the method of the camera is also binary/quantized in 
its own grounds and in the way in which it functions: the shutter button (Flusser calls it a 
key, and keys control the apparatus) is binary -- on/off. The world of pictures is created 
through an understanding of the rules of the apparatus: once we control the quantized 
data that determines photographic apparatus, we can produce informed technical images. 
By informed we mean technical images which are in dialogue both with the rules of the 
apparatus, but also in meaningful dialogue with the world out there which is being 
photographed, a world of data points and networks (i.e. non-aesthetic, but rather data-
based relations):  
The true photographer, in the sense meant in this essay, is interested (as 
the chess player) in seeing in ever newer ways, and thus, in producing ever 
newer, more informative situations. Since its beginnings, the development 
of photography has been a process through which the concept of 
information has grown more and more conscious.3 
 
The drive for ever more “informational” pictures leads to regular people creating photos 
such as the picture on the following page: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Flusser. Towards a Philosophy of Photography 42 
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4 
The above picture shows a type of selfie produced by a Russian teen who climbed a Hong 
Kong skyscraper.5 This sort of activity, although perhaps present in previous generations, 
has absolutely exploded in volume in recent years. The sharing aspect of this type of 
photography obviously drives this sort of activity. This type of photography expresses the 
growing “virtuality” of modern life to a breathtaking degree -- the production of the 
photo is intricately linked to the way in which it is shared. Flusser writes that the image 
has turned us around: instead of simply looking at images in order to reflect on the world, 
we’ve begun to hallucinate in real life as if living within images6:  
Images are mediations between the world and human beings. Human 
beings ‘ex-ist,’ i.e. the world is not immediately accessible to them and 
therefore images are needed to make it comprehensible. However, as soon 
as this happens, images come between the world and human beings. They 
are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens: instead of representing 
the world, they obscure it until human beings’ lives finally become a 
function of the images they create. Human beings cease to decode the 
                                                
4 Raskalov, Vitaliy, and Vadim Mahkorov. What's Up Hong Kong. 2014. On the Roofs, Hong Kong. On 
the Roofs. Web. 12 Mar. 2016. 
5 Raskalov, Vitaliy, and Vadim Mahkorov. What's Up Hong Kong. 
6 Any quotes that are underlined, bolded or italicized, in this document have been added for emphasis. 
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images and instead project them, still encoded, into the world ‘out there,’ 
which meanwhile itself becomes like an image -- a context of scenes, of 
states of things.7 
 
The first chapter will highlight what differentiates the technical images from traditional 
images, as well as outline the ways in which the technical image anthropomorphizes 
informational devices while diluting individual subjectivity. The following chapter will 
define the concepts specific to Flusser’s theory of communication and human history, 
from his particular notion of the abstract, to the necessary steps in the evolution of the 
image and visual thinking that lead to the world of the technical image. In this way there 
will be enough accumulated groundwork of Flusser’s theories to describe our present 
day, which Flusser describes as the early phases of a telematic faux utopia, where the 
technical image is the cornerstone of human connectivity and is indistinguishable from 
raw data. The power of the technical image of data comes to redefine the relationship 
between the average person and the production of information. Rather than a passive 
consumer, the subject is now a creator of information dialectically defined by his 
relationship to decentralized informational apparatuses, of which the camera is the 
prototype, and the computer/smartphone is the apex. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Flusser. Towards a Philosophy 7-10. 
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How are Technical Images Different from “Traditional” Images? 
 
 
More complex technical images include videos, databases, models, and charts. 
This is a crucial point: although databases are number-based, and computer-code is 
language based, the underlying thought that structures the way the computer apparatus 
works is actually built on the same roots as those of the photographic apparatus. Both are 
black boxes with certain rules controlled by keys which are engaged by us; our 
engagement with those keys defines us dialectically. As such, computer culture, even in 
its non-pictorial iterations, is actually visual culture at its very core. If the concept of a 
technical image seems foreign, one should perhaps attempt to approach it from a semi-
Platonic space. Plato argued that truth resided in forms, and that the things we see are not 
actually the ultimate examples of their form, but rather a particular nested within several 
potential subsets of that particular form. 8 9 For instance, you read this essay on a sheet of 
paper -- that sheet of paper is, yes, a sheet of paper, but it is not the ultimate sheet of 
paper. It is simply an example (i.e. a degraded singular example of a particular form) of a 
form paper. Technical images are the same; this is a critical point. The computer image 
(or model or database) are not advanced forms of photography -- they are simply 
different forms of the technical image which function identically in certain modes having 
                                                
8 Flusser’s writing, which is often exhilarating, is extremely odd when looked at from an academic 
perspective. In perhaps pointing to the fact that academic discourse more or less fails to engage with 
computational visual culture up until the 1980s (there is some engagement in the society of control and 
visual thinking present in Deleuze in the early 90s, but even here it is extremely crude), Flusser simply 
refuses to cite or engage with other scholars, though he is certainly deeply influenced by many philosophers 
and writers. Flusser addresses this in most of the introductions of his books, but even so the effect of such a 
technical philosophical book having no footnotes or citations is still bizarre. The one exception is a lengthy 
reference to Plato towards the end of Into the Universe of the Technical Image. See pages 54,141-151 of 
the same book. 
9 Flusser, Vilém. "To Suffer." Into the Universe of Technical Images. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 2011. 
54,141-151. Print. 
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to do with their root of having been produced by an apparatus, even if those apparatuses 
vary in complication from the simplest black-box camera to the most complex super 
computer.  
There is sometimes pushback to this kind of language around technical images in 
the popular imagination -  “it’s just a picture! Look! Is this a big deal? Is this the end of 
the world?” As a result, I feel that it is important to outline the significance of thinking 
about the technical image. We live in a deeply image-based culture which is, and most 
will agree immediately, also increasingly more complex, disorienting, and confusing. In 
my mind, such a complex and defining part of our daily lives (the technical image) 
deserves not only calm and serenity, but an open minded approach which allows us to 
slowly work through the fact that a painting and a computer graphic are different beasts 
entirely, despite their potential to represent similar pictorial content. That difference can 
be quickly summarized as the absence of human activity. The traditional image, in which 
category we must include cave paintings, canvas paintings, sketches, drawings, and so 
on, all have one thing in common: they are created by a person. That particular 
commonality adds one key feature: lack of informational reliability.10 No matter how 
photorealistic any of these images are, whenever we examine them we must start from 
the fact that they come from a person -- the artist that creates the image mediates its 
transference from the world to the canvas (or cave wall, or paper, and so on). The 
technical image, on the other hand, has this transference take place almost scientifically: 
through the use of a pre-programmed, reliably repeatable black box. The simplest of 
these is the camera, but there are many other such apparatuses. The difference plays out 
                                                
10 Flusser. Into 51. 
  
8 
into how much faith we can have in each of these images. Traditional images are by 
necessity merely interpretive: when we look at them, we see someone's take on a 
particular scene or object. Technical images, due to their scientific precision, are more 
like looking through a window. When we see a black and white photo on a negative, we 
are in fact looking at the physical byproduct of light having been exposed on that 
negative very precisely. As a result, it is much easier to trust the window of the technical 
image. Part of Flusser’s theory is that as technical images spread, and as we become more 
and more prolific creators of technical images, they begin to shift from windows into 
screens. Their reliability and endless possibilities start to send us into an imaginative 
daze. We begin to live in technical images only -- be these pictures, computers programs, 
databases, or computer models.11 
In 1970 Alvin Toffler wrote that we lived in a state of “Future Shock,” where 
things changed so quickly that keeping up was difficult.12 What can we say of 2016? This 
is all to say that the most complex technical images, those created by machines 
themselves in ways which only machines could, evade coherence entirely. Case in point, 
the following map outlining the US strategy in Afghanistan in 2003:  
(Image below, from Galloway, The Interface Effect, Page 79) 
 
 
                                                
11 Flusser. Into 51. 
12 Toffler, Alvin. "The 800th Lifetime." Future Shock. New York: Bantam, 1990. 9. Print. 
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General McChrystal famously declared  “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won 
the war.” 14 The judgment seems to be quite clear on whether we “lost” or “won” the 
war... Yet the sheer confusion of the image remains. It expresses, quite poignantly, 
actually, the fact that we are more than willing to admit total confusion in the face of the 
sheer and colossal complication created by the power of technical images.15 Unlike in a 
simple technical image, say, a photograph, figuration (the idea that the technical image is 
a “picture” which really “looks” like something) does not play a role in the above 
                                                
13 Galloway. The Interface 78. 
14 Galloway. The Interface 78. 
15 This map of the internet in Galloway is present next to the Afghanistan PowerPoint displayed in this 
essay. I found the PowerPoint slide to be more interesting as a technical image, particularly due to 
McChrystal’s quote, which I think explains the mainstream admitted confusion surrounding technical 
images surprisingly eloquently. More information about representable technical images is available in 
Galloway, Alexander R. "Are Some Things Unrepresentable?" The Interface Effect. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 2012. 78-100. Print. 
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technical image. Or perhaps it does, but only in a weird, cruel way: the technical image 
above, in its obtuseness, mirrors our bureaucratic and institutional apparatuses in their 
creative and exuberant nonsense.  
The point is, the technical image above has a purpose quite contrary to “looking 
like something”: its utilitarian purpose is simply to impress vastness and 
incomprehensibility of the network (we could say apparatus) we call the “the war in 
Afghanistan.” “It is unclear what exactly the slide is meant to convey or indeed if it is 
meant to convey anything at all... Unlike realism in painting or photography, wherein an 
increase in technical detail tends to bring a heightened sense of reality (at least in the 
traditional definition of aesthetic realism that has held sway more or less since the 
Renaissance), the high level of technical detail visible here overwhelms the human 
sensorium, attenuating the viewer’s sense of reality… effectively neutering its capacity as 
a vehicle for information.”16 A simplistic response might be to say they look like tangled 
webs -- though webs don’t often contain nodes which themselves are obtuse symbols for 
vastly complex, themselves likely unrepresentable/possibly incoherent systems, i.e. 
“Popular Support.” 
There is a YouTube video created by a sea turtle which eloquently expresses this 
unworkable, complex technical image. When a diving camera washed ashore in Florida’s 
Key West, a local coast guard picked it up.17 He eventually found its owner by posting 
the family pictures found on the camera on various diving forums. Soon, the camera’s 
origin was discovered: Dutch Naval Officer Dick de Bruin who was vacationing in Aruba 
                                                
16 Galloway, Alexander R. The Interface Effect 78-80. 
17 Leitner, Florian. "On Robots and Turtles: A Posthuman Perspective on Camera and Image Movement 
after Michael Snow’s La Région Centrale." Discourse 35.2 (2013): 263-77. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 24 Mar. 
2016. 
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some eleven hundred miles away, lost the camera eighteen months prior.18 Along the 
way, somewhere along Honduras, the camera had an encounter with a leatherback sea 
turtle: “The marine reptile appears to have used the traveling camera to shoot a short film, 
which Shultz [the Florida Coast Guard] found on the memory card among de Bruin’s [the 
naval officer’s] pictures.”19 The animal must have mistook the device for food and 
snatched at it, eventually hitting the release button (the apparatus key): “The clip that the 
camera recorded shows how the turtle plays around with it, banging against it, snapping 
at it, and keeping it in constant motion. The images that were captured in the process are 
rather shaky, as the camera is incessantly performing hectic tilts and pans.”20   
The entire process was automatic from the release of the shutter. Along the 
process the shaky and unpredictable footage has no resemblance to human subjectivity, 
and yet the video is oddly captivating, having accrued millions of views on YouTube. All 
functional steps that happen to the camera are required in order for this video to come 
into existence: 1) the camera must be lost, 2) it must be picked up by the turtle, 3) it must 
be then found when it washed ashore and finally 4) that video must be posted online. The 
apparatus that created this video, then, is not a camera per se, but rather the apparatus of a 
global data network, as well as the apparatus (or perhaps, the medium) of the ocean, and 
so on, and so forth.21 Human intention is delinked from these technical images, and yet 
they are pregnant with the most fascinating, sublime meaning. These technical images are 
pregnant with the presence of a global image network -- the Internet. It cannot be 
                                                
18 Leitner 264. 
19 Leitner 264. 
20 Leitner 264. 
21 Leitner 265. 
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understood or sympathized with in an anthropomorphized way, because it lacks human 
intention.  
Yet, the video went viral nearly overnight. The marine reptile is barely seen 
throughout the fifteen-minute video and none of the images that it captures are 
particularly interesting. Its success on YouTube with a more or less universal (across all 
age groups and across a variety of nationalities) audience was more linked to its 
production and the interplay of seemingly unconnected agents than any of the movement 
on screen. This is understood intuitively – the people watching the film might not be able 
to verbalize that this is what they find fascinating about it, but that’s it: the fact that it was 
created “by accident” through a complicated interplay of media and networks. 
As Leitner eloquently explains, “The sea turtle is an aesthetic object… This 
renunciation of traditional aesthetics is only possible because of a hybrid network that 
transgresses nationalities, species, and the divides between organic and nonorganic and 
between nature and technology. The network consists of a camera and a waterproof case, 
a sloppy diver, the currents in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, a sea animal, an 
altruistic Coast Guard officer, and a global online community.”22 The ocean, along with 
the Internet, is in fact a sort of medium required in order for this video to be produced, 
much like a negative is required in order to produce a photo. The widespread interest that 
the video accrues has almost nothing to do with any formalistic or aesthetic portion of the 
video, but rather with a sublime/structural understanding of how the video was produced, 
as well as the emblematic nature of the production’s fluidity and serendipity. The agents 
                                                
22 Leitner 270. 
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that acted on the production of the sea turtle’s film and brought all of them together is 
formless because it is made up of data: 
drawing on the shift from solid to fluid performed by the turtle’s 
film—as fluid inasmuch as they constitute complex systems, and 
trying to get hold of whoever or whatever determines the behavior 
of these systems is pointless; there is constantly something slipping 
through our fingers. This is because the underlying material is 
formless, a property that not only applies to water but also to data, 
as Alexander Galloway recently pointed out in connection with 
attempts to draw maps of the Internet.23 24 
 
In reality, the turtle video is actually not too dissimilar from the way in which certain 
human technical images function. The selfie, easily the most emblematic of all modern 
modes of network photography, is often produced and interpreted not on strictly aesthetic 
means, but rather through the points of shareable data which it contains. Posting a selfie 
is about how things look, yes, but it is in fact much more about prostration before the 
network and our place within it. In short, we share images not for representational value, 
but to tie ourselves into a larger network and what gives us meaning in connection to 
particular data points: “Nevertheless, the images that are exchanged on platforms such as 
Facebook seem to form part of an aesthetic practice that conceives of them not primarily 
as representational objects in their own right but as components of a system whose 
autopoiesis is perpetuated through a constant transmitting and receiving of digital 
images.”25 Hence the value of a selfie with, say, a famous person – it is a rare occurrence 
and therefore something to be shared as highly informational: “on a particular day I ran 
into Obama and took a selfie with him.” Or a selfie which is shared by many other users, 
                                                
23 This map of the internet in Galloway is present next to the Afghanistan powerpoint displayed in this 
essay. More information about representable technical images is available in Galloway’s The Interface 
Effect, in the chapter “Are some things Unrepresentable?” pgs. 78-100. 
24 Leitner, Florian. 271 
25 Leitner, Florian. 275 
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multiplicating its meaning many number of times. Or a selfie taken by a Russian teenager 
atop a building. And so I arrive at the fulcrum of my project: my aim is to describe how 
the technical image, which is at the very core of our culture today, is in fact a 
technologically aided method of thinking (or imagining) which has outstripped our 
powers to control it and as a result come to absolutely dominate our lives. Further, 
through this domination, the technical image has created a type of visual culture that has 
ensnared us silently. Not only are we, in essence, “non-existing” if we refuse to 
participate in this global image network but the network and computational visual culture 
has evolved and become complex to the point we are often times no longer able to create 
meaning within it at all. 26 Rather that meaning is created on a blistering scale by 
algorithms which although “dumb” in some sense, are actually able to create things 
which begin to confuse us in regards to aesthetic value. A good case in point are Google 
Earth Street View images. These are very popular, and quite useful: they are essentially a 
series of photos created by cars which drive with full-view cameras perched atop their 
roofs. The images created by these cars are often completely uninteresting: a random 
street with pedestrians; cars in traffic, etc. Yet here and there certain pictures are picked 
up, completely at random, which mirror known aesthetic principles long practiced by 
artists, such as in the following example:  
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Which, again, encompasses all apparatus-driven human function. Not only photos, but emails, text 
messages, database driven data activities such as Uber, Seamless, and so on, and so forth. 
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The above image was created by a “dumb” apparatus – it merely took millions of 
pictures until it arrived at that one. 27 And yet one has a difficult time not aligning the 
composition, exposure, and narrative inherent in the image according to our long-
nurtured aesthetic principles. This might not be so troubling because it is random – 
literally the idea that a monkey (or machine) taking random pictures will one day take a 
very beautifully composed masterpiece. Much more troubling is the algorithm based on 
Google’s “Deep Dream” which uses a neural network capable of “machine learning.” 
The Deep Dream system is capable of analyzing particular painter’s styles in order to 
create paintings that mimic it. The following set of images is a scale representing Deep 
Dream attempting to paint a row of houses in the style of Van Gogh: 
                                                
27 20 Most Beautiful Google Street View Images EVER! N.d. Hifi Public. Web. 5 Dec. 2015. 
<http://hifipublic.com/2014/11/26/20-most-beautiful-google-street-view-images-ever/>. 
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28 
Although primitive, this neural network has made great strides towards creating realistic, 
“creative” works of art that, chances are, might pass as man-made in front of all but the 
most well-trained observers. A researcher with this program writes that their “work offers 
a path forward to an algorithmic understanding of how humans create and perceive 
artistic imagery”.29 These examples highlight ways in which domains previously thought 
to be human are now becoming dominated by machines. Although these example may be 
scary to some, they pale in comparison to the problems explored by Flusser in the advent 
of the technical image. For Flusser, the encounter with the apparatus is one that 
dialectically robotizes man (or woman). The point is not that machines are becoming 
                                                
28 Computers Can Now Paint like Van Gogh and Picasso. 2015. Quartz. Web. 17 Jan. 2016. 
<http://qz.com/495614/computers-can-now-paint-like-van-gogh-and-picasso/>. 
29 Murphy, Mike. "Computers Can Now Paint like Van Gogh and Picasso."Quartz. N.p., 06 Sept. 2015. 
Web. 17 Jan. 2016. 
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more like man, but far more perversely, that the apparatus has made a machine out of 
man. As a result, the only way in which we are able to create topical, relevant, up-to-date 
information is by doing it as if we were machines. Hence why it is so easy for computers 
to mimic our “art forms.” Hence why it is so intuitive for a child to understand that the 
turtle video is interesting due to the way in which it was “made” – outside of any human 
intention.  A nearly infinite variety of bits of meaning and topical information now come 
from apparatuses that completely excise us – apparatuses that literally have no humans 
driving them.  
But why are technical images so magical to us? Why are we so captivated by 
them? Why do we feel a need to create them as if by nature? Answers to these questions 
require an explanation of the entirety of Flusser’s conception of information and history, 
and so will take a while. The quickest way to put it is the following: we went to technical 
images in order to better express things/events we could not write about or understand, 
things caught in particles, waves, and modes of movement. These “things” we sought to 
express are too complicated for words and as a result required the aid of a machine which 
could capture them. Our use of these machines reconfigured not only our ability to see, 
but also our ability to understand ourselves without the machine and the technical image 
(emphasis mine):  
The structure of culture -- and therefore of existence itself -- is 
undergoing a fundamental change... The magical nature of images 
must be taken into account when decoding them… It is wrong to 
look for ‘frozen events’ in images… Rather [images] replace 
events by states of things and translate them into scenes. The 
magical power of images lies in their ‘superficial nature’, and the 
dialectic inherent in them… Images are mediations between the 
world and human beings. Human beings ‘ex-ist,’ i.e. the world is 
not immediately accessible to them and therefore images are 
needed to make it comprehensible. However, as soon as this 
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happens, images come between the world and human beings. They 
are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens: instead of 
representing the world, they obscure it until human beings’ lives 
finally become a function of the images they create.30 (originally 
published in 1984) 
 
By which Flusser means the thrill of creating technical images is such, and so powerful, 
that it shines a light into a new mode of thinking, one in which images express not only 
our needs but also our desires. Soon we are caught in a world in which to create images is 
to express existence itself. 
 
Human beings cease to decode the images and instead project 
them, still encoded, into the world ‘out there,’ which meanwhile 
itself becomes like an image -- a context of scenes, of states of 
things. This reversal of the function of the image can be called 
idolatry; we can observe the process at work in the present day: the 
technical images currently all around us are in the process of 
magically restructuring our reality and turning it into a ‘global 
image scenario’. (note: the internet as we know it now in 2016) 
Essentially this is a question of ‘amnesia’. Human beings forget 
they created the images in order to orientate themselves in the 
world. Since they are no longer able to decode them, their lives 
become a function of their own images: imagination has turned 
into hallucination.31 (published in 1984) 
 
The problem, then, is that this technologically-aided method of thinking (or visualizing, 
or “imagi-ning”) completely consumes and codifies us, to the point that nothing is 
relevant which is not image based (or which is not online), including our own perception 
of ourselves. As a result, the dialectical subject created by the technical image is one 
who, perhaps in an act of self-defense, denies the power of the technical image in the first 
place. He might point to a photograph and say “this is an image, is this dangerous?” The 
correct answer to that question is “Yes, the technical image is dangerous.” The technical 
image, run amok, can erase subjectivity and create a world which is posthuman, that is, a 
                                                
30 Flusser Towards 7-8. 
31 Flusser Towards 9-10. 
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world in which that which is truly relevant and truly meaningful is not producible (or 
indeed understandable) by people. That is the danger of the technical image: the process 
of human intention is at stake. 32 
Technical images inspire us with a particular ethic or spirit. Due to this constant 
creation, we easily tire of the mundane and everyday image. We intuitively know that 
certain pictures express nothing that has not been seen before. The apparatus calls upon 
us to produce technical images that are possible and improbable. Part of the thrill of 
photography, which even novice photographers experience, has to do with seeing the 
world through the camera for the first time. People innately begin to realize that the 
images they produce are not based on a figurative representation, like in the way 
renaissance paintings often were, but rather on an innate (if somewhat incomprehensible) 
vastness contained in the mechanical method of their production. Which is to say, the 
technical image dissolves “subjectivity as such and transfers aesthetic agency from a 
human creator subject into a hybrid, dispersed actor network”.33 Put simply: part of what 
we appreciate about certain technical images today is simply the way in which they are 
the byproduct of a massive, all consuming and seemingly uncontrollable world-network, 
of which we are a small particle and out of which we seem to struggle to disentangle 
ourselves, and this is based on the way apparatuses work, period. They define us as 
creators of 2-dimensional images, images that are free to then travel the world away from 
our grasp. If the world out there is made of particles, the camera gives us an easy and 
                                                
32 See Leitner’s Sea Turtle essay for the definition of a post-human technical image -- an image created not 
with any subjectivity rooted in a person, but instead created through a non-anthropomorphic subjectivity 
spread through technical networks and non-human interfaces. Increasingly, these kinds of images are the 
ones, which actually express relevant information, and meaning that is topical to our modern data driven 
world. 
33 Leitner, Florian. 273. 
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immediate (nearly self-intuitive, when we watch the joy of someone first taking pictures) 
way of capturing these particles. Put even more simply, and more perversely, technical 
images are how we communicate not only from person to person, but also in a more 
devastating and nefarious way: without technical images, we no longer know how we fit 
in the world, we are no longer able to make sense of the large number of particles which 
dance in front of our eyes. In fact, Flusser comes to argue that post-technical image we 
may not fit anywhere at all. Flusser writes that since our digits and our brains are the only 
requirements to create information through the apparatus, we will eventually be only that: 
a brain connected to digits connected to machines. But not all is lost: a certain human 
freedom remains to those who don’t desire to be only brains pumping (and watching 
images) forever. You don’t have to watch images all day – there is a way out, which I 
detail at the end of this thesis. That possibility, one which will likely shock, will be 
revealed at the end of this paper.  
Before that, a short detour: one will enjoy a greater understanding and 
appreciation of Flusser’s theories and scope through a brief understanding of his 
biography. Although he started as a journalist in Sao Paulo, Flusser eventually became 
interested in communication, information theory, and the philosophy of photography.34 
Vilem Flusser’s scholarly career was international and multilingual. He was born in 1920 
to a Jewish family in Prague and escaped the Holocaust in 1940 by fleeing first to 
London and eventually to Sao Paulo, Brazil. After a bitter disagreement with his father, 
Flusser left Prague with his girlfriend’s family for London. An established member of the 
community, Flusser’s father Gustav was unlikely to budge. Early after his arrival in 
                                                
34 Finger, Anke K., Rainer Guldin, and Gustavo Bernardo. "Migration, Nomadism, Networks." Vilém 
Flusser: An Introduction. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 2011. 17. Print. 
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England, Flusser learned that his immediate family had been sent to concentration camps, 
including Auschiwitz and Buchenwald.35 They were all killed there. This left Flusser in a 
period of extreme depression that was compounded by his move to Brazil.36 There, 
Flusser worked at a Czech warehouse for imported goods. In his spare time he wrote to 
an opinion column in a local Sao Paulo newspaper and submitted articles for philosophy 
publications. Although depressed over the death of his family, Flusser was happy that he 
had finally found a life in which he could “work during the day and philosophize through 
the night.”37 After a few years, he started working in a radio factory, increasing his 
interest in the philosophy of information and communication. His technical background 
as well as his many years of self-guided study of philosophy eventually leading to an 
academic position teaching in the Engineering School of the University of Sao Paulo.38 
This technical background allowed Flusser deep insights into the nature of information 
and its spread. 
Flusser published widely in Portuguese, passing his years with a steady stream of 
books and newspaper articles. A majority of this early work remains unpublished though 
it concerns topics such as language philosophy and Brazilian identity.39 Flusser moved 
back to Europe in 1973 where he spent a largely reclusive decade while he struggled to 
understand the technical image and the history of visual culture. The study of information 
(as well as his personal history in displacement) and its spread led him towards in an 
interest in the concept of homelessness, not in the physical sense, but in that of those who 
                                                
35 Finger. An Introduction 7. 
36 Finger. An Introduction 14. 
37 Finger. An Introduction 19. 
38 Finger. An Introduction 22. 
39 Finger. An Introduction 54. 
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are forced into exile, a group that grew in numbers in the 20th century and which has 
become an important political category. By the 1980s, he had finally developed his 
mature concept of the camera as the first widely available computational apparatus. 
Starting in 1983, with the publication of Towards a Philosophy of Photography, Flusser 
became deeply involved in an ambitious project, attempting to conceptualize media 
history’s rising importance in modern culture.40 He eventually began to describe a sort of 
intense informational homelessness as the quintessential state of man in modern digital 
society. Through his study of photography, data, and networks, Flusser is able to predict 
the arrival of online services such as Amazon, Google, and YouTube in the early 1980s, 
many years before personal computers and home consumer internet were a reality. He 
offers a profound observation on the interconnection of media and the way in which 
subjects become controlled. Interestingly enough, Flusser was readily adopted in 
Germany as a founder of the fledgling discipline of Media Studies, so much so that the 
German Federal Cultural Foundation awards a yearly “Vilem Flusser Theory Award” to 
media and digital theorists who have distinguished themselves in the mold of Flusser’s 
thinking.41 By contrast, the thinker has been virtually unknown in the English speaking 
world, though his notoriety has been quickly rising. His books have been translated at an 
ever quickening pace. We live in a house punctured with holes, he wrote, a house with 
cables which broadcast both in and out, leaving us without any privacy, and hence 
without any home. In 1991, he visited the Czech Republic for the first time since leaving 
                                                
40 Finger. An Introduction. Xxiii. 
41 Marburger, Marcel René. "Archive." Vilém Flusser Theory Award 2011. Federal Cultural Foundation, 
31 July 2011. Web. 29 Mar. 2016. <https://transmediale.de/node/12944>. 
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as a teenager. He died shortly thereafter in a horrific car accident. His body rests in the 
New Jewish Cemetery in the city of his birth.42 
I am deeply drawn to Flusser because I believe that he expresses, unlike any other 
writer I have ever encountered, the tenuous position that we find ourselves in as 
consumers and producers stuck in our current visual culture. It is to my great dismay that 
In many classes I have read things that blatantly and completely ignore this modern state. 
Rather than prepare us for an increasingly dangerous and more complex 
visual/computational landscape, I’ve found that the curriculum actually strives to give us 
thinking from a previous era -- from an era in which linearity and causality, rather than 
particles and energy, ruled. Particularly disappointing has been the way in which many 
students, and unfortunately many professors, fail to understand the way in which 
aesthetic regimens which guide our taste and culture are fundamentally class based and 
therefore determined, rather than real.  
And yet most class discussions completely ignore this fact. Students are allowed 
to pontificate on paintings, photographs, films, books, as if their mode of thinking or their 
thoughts are provenant from their intellectual curiosity or training.  Aesthetic modes of 
reading art (and the world) are completely culturally codified and socially installed on 
students. Art (images) do not exist in a vacuum and are not readable outside of a 
particular culture, no matter how broad this particular artifact is. Works of art require an 
aesthetic judgment that meets it halfway. Yet students and faculty do not behave as if this 
were the case – they take their taste (intrinsically connected to their class) as proof of 
their good nature, of their validity and thoughtfulness. What is praised and highly 
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regarded in our classes is unfortunately a carefully camouflaged form of obedience. The 
obedient, who through their insistence and tenacity nod so much to the point that they 
forget and only agree, are highly regarded in our circles. The obedient student is praised 
for his appreciation of centuries-old artifacts, artifacts that are derivative of our culture. A 
caveperson encountering a painting would likely not have an aesthetic judgment induced 
from it. There is little appreciation to the culturally induced aesthetic judgment. But these 
students, who in school have been shielded from harm through their obedience, will one 
day be face to face with a blistering, violent world in which valuable information is 
created not by obedience and acceptance, but by vision and the apparatus43. This is to 
say: our school is stuck in the past, and Flusser speaks to the future.  
Flusser’s global image network describes data-driven mediation through images, 
and how this mediation comes our functionary qualities. Images are two dimensional and 
therefore appear almost magical. Hence they do not capture causality but rather suggest 
scenes and relationships between objects caught within it. All of these are simply 
“floating” objects which suggest one another. In “life,” the cock’s crowing is triggered by 
the morning – there is a linear relationship which when written about only goes one way. 
In a painting there is no causality -- the cock’s crowing denotes the morning in the same 
                                                
43 This is not a new problem: “A key question [for Baldessari] was how to contend with the sham of taste—
and artistic subjectivity more generally—as a refuge or antidote to the crass engines of the market.” (Kelsey 
746). In the 1960s and 1970s much of the American art establishment was celebrating New York school 
paintings as a national triumph of individual expression, while a young generation of artists were 
developing strategies for disavowing subjectivity and match the operating logic of capitalism: 
“a young generation of artists was developing new strategies for disavowing subjectivity. These strategies 
took opposing positions on the role of chance. One strategy consisted of miming the strict logic of 
administrative calculation. Benjamin Buchloh has argued that conceptual art engaged in such mimesis to 
eradicate all vestiges of traditional aesthetic experience and to refuse any compensatory cooperation with 
industrial forces. According to this view, conceptual artists, in an act of disenchantment, reproduced the 
operating logic of capitalist society instead of purporting to offer a sanctuary of aesthetic delight.” I would 
venture say that we somehow have regressed, or at least forgotten the lessons from these young artists. I 
would also say that the mechanistic, deterministic logic being expressed by these artists was not entirely 
that of capitalism alone, but also the utilitarian and machine like logic of the apparatus and its production.  
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way that the reverse is true, because the painting is a scene that contains these related 
objects and events.44 As a result, images (technical or otherwise) live in a world of 
“eternal return of the same,” of being stuck and of being in awe.45 As people begin to live 
in a world of images, they turn into “reality” and become confused: they begin to treat the 
world as it composed of scenes that are “imagined” in the sense that they function as 
images.46 Nowadays people live not in a causal relation, but in a “global image network.” 
Certain things which are believed in the internet rupture through the fabric of our lives 
with intense violence.  
The global-image network creates a user (in Flusser’s terms, a functionary) who is 
him/herself computational by nature. The functionary is dialectically defined through 
contact with the apparatus:   
Technical images are produced by apparatuses. In saying this, one 
presumes the typical characteristic of apparatus as such -- in a 
simplified, embryonic form -- are also contained within the camera 
and can be derived from it…” The camera, as a prototype of the 
apparatuses that have become so decisive for the present and 
immediate future, provides an appropriate starting point for a 
general analysis of apparatus -- those apparatuses that, on the one 
hand, assumed gigantic size, threatening to disappear from our 
field of vision… and, on the other, shrivel up, becoming 
microscopic in size so as to totally escape our grasp… 
 
Is a camera a tool like a needle or a pair of scissors? Tools in the 
usual sense tear objects from the natural world in order to bring 
them to the place (produce them) where the human being is. In this 
process they change the form of these objects: they imprint a new, 
intentional form onto them. They “inform” them: the object 
acquires an unnatural; an improbable form; it becomes cultural.47    
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45 See Into the Universe of the Technical Image 59. 
46 Flusser. Into the Universe 37. 
47 Flusser. Towards a Philosophy of Photography 21. 
  
26 
The technical image (of which the photograph is the most defining example), although 
sometimes pictorial, is essentially mostly mediated data. This mediation is a form of 
contact between an apparatus-defined functionary and the particles that the apparatus 
captures. Everyone knows that when they look at a photograph they aren’t seeing the real 
thing pictured, but rather an object created as the chemical byproduct of a machine whose 
sole purpose is to create that object. The apparatuses that produce technical images call 
upon us to act as its users/functionaries in an almost slavish way. Our job becomes 
pressing the shutter (or digits of a computer) in order to create highly segmented data 
points. As a result, the technical image begins to become a more clearly central part of 
computational society: in an information world where data and information is being 
created at an absurd pace, the creation of the image through the binary process of 
pressing and releasing the shutter is the only way in which we can feel that we create 
meaning ourselves, it is the only way in which we feel relevant. This creation takes place 
in a, yes, global, but in a sense to a culture that is short lived and brief, one that is data-
defined, one that springs not from culturally-determined biases but from ethics which are 
suggested by the way in which the apparatus works and the way in which the apparatus 
defines us dialectically. The biases, for instance, which lead certain works of art to rise to 
prominence within a particular cultural and socio-economic class of people, such as the 
mostly very narrowly circumscribed tendencies of the upper class. Yet what is the 
meaning of this meaning we create in this data-driven global image network? What is its 
purpose? Does it fulfill us? Does it create or shine a light in questions that are profound?  
Why is it that, at least in the “developed world”, people with free time and 
without worry choose to work, associate with or leisure around the image? Why are 
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artists the hippest members of our society? Why is “everyone an artist” nowadays? Why 
is it that meaning has been distilled down to the “meme” to such an aggressive degree? 
Why is it that entire conversations (rather, scenes and episodes) are suggested by the use 
of a familiar image and a line of text that remixes it? People who share and create memes 
are remixing all of the possible variations on the information contained within a single 
image, and thus mining for further information within an image that seemed as if it was 
already spent. This search that users go on, this granular remixing of all particular 
readings of a certain image strikes at the very core of the technical image: it is primarily 
data, and only pictorial in a derivative sense.  
There are certain artists who speak directly to this data-driven, machine mediated 
nature of modern visual culture. This is the reason why memes are at the center of our 
modern culture: meme-culture is the ultimate granulation of the data-narrative pregnant 
within the technical image. Memes are images, videos, or turns of phrase which are 
rapidly disseminated through online communities. They often include a reference to a 
particular scene or context, and often include a strong emphasis of the applicability of the 
referenced scene/context in other places. One common meme practice includes particular 
images which denote a certain feeling: one possible example is “Success kid,” a meme 
which involved a baby clenching his fist as if celebrating something positive. There are 
literally thousands upon thousands of remixed versions of this image which repurpose it 
for particular events related to individual internet users. Through the meme, internet users 
are able to mine images for more and more meaning and context, until the point in which 
all of the contexts and possibilities within the particular scene/context denoted in the 
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meme are finally expressed. This is machine-like behavior: it is as if internet users were49 
working, in a totally decentralized and unplanned way, to create a database of the entirety 
of possibilities having to do with “success” as denoted by this baby. 
 
Through the meme, one image can express an absurd number of situations, 
scenes, and contexts. This is essentially the way in which the technical image, and 
telematics in particular, work for Flusser. The technical image is an image which contains 
within it a variety of contexts, and those contexts can be celebrated by users as they 
                                                
49 McCoral, Greg. "Success Kid." Know Your Meme News. N.p., 15 Aug. 2007. Web. 1 May 2016. 
  
29 
remix with each other. An artist that represents this apparatus driven remixing better than 
anyone is John Baldessari: 
50 
Each hat is, in a sense, the same, but, in a very real and total sense, completely different. 
What is important is not the content of the photos, but rather the ethic expressed by the 
continuous creation of all of these different photos -- they express the work of the 
apparatus in its variations. In fact, each photo is unique and granular, despite being nearly 
identical, and for all intents and purpose, almost entirely meaningless. The group 
expresses the central tenet of Flusser’s thinking: that photos mean not visually, but by the 
way in which they define us as readers and capturers of data. In a description of 
Baldessari’s mode of creation, Robin Kelsey writes the following:  
The aim of the artist was not to be to instruct the viewer but to give 
viewers information. Whether the viewer understands this 
information is incidental to the artist; he cannot foresee the 
understanding of all his viewers. He would follow his 
predetermined premise to its conclusion avoiding subjectivity. 
Chance, taste or unconsciously remembered forms would play no 
part in the outcome. The serial artist does not attempt to produce a 
beautiful or mysterious object but functions merely as a clerk 
cataloging the results of his premise.51  
 
This makes Baldessari one of the most Flusserian artists. One of his key goals as an artist 
is to expose the data-driven nature of our current image cultures. Further, Baldessari, 
under the influence of Sol LeWitt, attempts to make himself into a functionary par 
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excellence, a programmed robotic creator who simply follows rules towards their 
ultimate meaning: 
…the artist as clerk carries out a stiff calculus, accumulating 
results that follow inexorably from chosen premises. LeWitt 
imagines the artist as a kind of bureaucratic cog churning out 
mechanically determined outcomes. ‘The idea,’ he said elsewhere, 
‘becomes a machine that makes the art.’ Chance plays no part in 
the process.’52  
 
Sol LeWitt is a minimalist artist who essentially created rules that then were transferred 
into either drawings or sculptures, prints, etc. “The idea,” in LeWitt’s words, is how 
LeWitt created. He essentially created rules which were then followed to their completion 
resulting in some highly-determined, causal object.53 “The idea,” in our current world and 
study, is not an abstract set of rules, but it is also programmed. “The idea” for us is the 
apparatus – it is with the apparatus that we think. The apparatus is also programmed – it 
contains certain rules that accept certain inputs and spit out certain outputs, all according 
to a deterministic, causal program. What both Baldessari and LeWitt understood 
intuitively is that modernity is algorithmic -- meaning is created through the carrying out 
of particular programs or games. As a result, both LeWitt and Baldessari mimic or 
recreate the modes of the apparatus, each in their particular way. Note that both are keen 
to reference themselves as robots; as being cogs and parts of a program that they are 
simply following along. This is not further from our own existence in a global-image 
network: we are cogs who accept and spit out images according to (our own as well as 
other) programs. The images that we accept and spit out include photographs, databases, 
models, and essays, such as the one you are reading. Now, the global-image network is 
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exceedingly complicated, far more complicated than the already extremely complicated 
camera and computer. As a result, there are certain types of meta-level programming far 
beyond our ability to influence. And, as already put forth, the apparatus itself programs 
us as functionary users upon our encounter. A large part of whether we are able to escape 
this world of technical images and their grasp comes down to whether or not we can 
program ourselves. That is, whether or not we are able to, like Baldessari and LeWitt, to 
make ourselves into cogs which still know some sort of humanity.  
One more extremely instructive work that explains the way in which apparatuses 
produce, is LeWitt’s “Sentences on Conceptual Art.”54 Part of LeWitt’s work was to set-
up circumstances and rules which then were carried out into a particular object much like 
the apparatus is its own program which once activated creates the technical image. So 
that in this sense the artist, now dictated by the necessity for an audience and by the direct 
monetary value of his work, creates a set of rules after which he or she becomes the clerk 
of what those rules produced. Sentence 29 of LeWitt’s “Sentences on Conceptual Art” 
states the following: “The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It 
should run its course.”55 In a way, LeWitt intuitively understood the method of creation 
nascent in his own time: that of a program which carries out its instructions until meaning 
is created. Through the apparatus, we are all made artists like Baldessari and LeWitt. 
Whether or not we know it is another question; whether or not we can program ourselves 
free and away from the tightening grip of these apparatuses and the world they create is 
yet another. 
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Each of the Baldessari photos is its own set of data, and hence each image is its 
own remix on the concept, the concept of a man holding a hat over his face. And yet, 
taking a step back, we see that each picture only gains total meaning when put next to 
others. All pictures only gain total meaning as a set, a set which in reality has 
meaninglessness at its very core: it’s a picture of a man holding a hat to his face. How 
many million variations exist? At least as many as there are men and hats, and possibly as 
many as all of the combinations. In getting entangled and marred in the world of the 
technical images, we are all become artists; we have all become remix experts. We have 
all become our very own versions of John Baldessari, and yet are we any different from 
one another insofar as we are functionaries defined by a decentralized apparatus? What 
kind of artist is “created” by a machine? What kind of artist is the same as all the others? 
Why are we so driven by this desire to get to the bottom of all possibilities of the 
technical image in itself?  
It’s hard not to envision a world like the one portrayed in the film Wall-E, in 
which people spend most of their lives confined to their chairs in entertainment consoles. 
One assumes that from the console, these characters fulfill all their needs, and that any 
incidental problem is fixed by a robot servant of some sort. We might one day be the 
same way: In the telematic society, that is the faux-utopian end-point of Flusser’s visual 
culture world, we find ourselves in “a situation in which everyone contemplates images, 
whether it be to receive, to change, or to forward them on, and in which the cycle of the 
economy and the process of production takes place behind people’s backs,” performed by 
robots.56 Not everything is perfect, however, as the trade off for this feverish dream of 
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constant exchange of images is not only the disappearance of our subjectivity, but also 
our transformation into a controlled species: 
The scenario, the fable, I propose here is this: people will sit in 
separate cells, playing with their fingertips on keyboards, staring at 
tiny screens, receiving, changing, and sending images. Behind their 
backs, robots will bring them things to maintain and reproduce 
their derelict bodies. People will be in contact with one another 
through their fingertips and so form a dialogical net, a global 
superbrain, whose function will be to calculate and compute 
improbable situations into pictures, to bring information, 
catastrophes about. Artificial intelligences will also be in dialogue 
with human beings, connected through cables and similar nerve 
strands. In terms of function, then, it will be meaningless to try to 
distinguish between natural and artificial intelligences (between 
primate brains and secondary brains). The whole thing will 
function as a cybernetically controlled system that cannot be 
divided into constituent elements: a black box. The prevailing state 
of mind will be reminiscent of the one we experience in our 
creative moments, the experience of being out of oneself, of 
adventure, of orgasm.57  
 
Technical images, and telematics, are our attempt to overcome death through 
information, despite the potential dehumanizing costs. Telematics are how Flusser sees 
the endpoint of the global-image network. Telematics are how we will attempt to make 
the best out of what in the end amounts to little more than enslavement to the image and 
the machines that create it. 
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Flusser’s Conceptions of History, Communication, and Culture 
 
The most important contribution Flusser made was his description of the universe 
of technical images. But in order to understand what is meant by the universe of technical 
images, one must first understand the larger scope of Flusser’s view of information and 
history in general. Flusser defines a variety of terms which although familiar sounding, 
have a very specific definition within his framework of information and subjectivity. This 
can be somewhat tiresome, but it is worth the effort, as his framework allows for 
profound insights into the nature of images and visual culture. The simplest way to sum 
his project is to describe it as: 1) a history of culture informed by a specific definition of 
information (and also how abstracted this information is from our experience); 2) the 
apparatuses that create that information; 3) the human relations created by those 
apparatuses; 4) and the second law of thermodynamics. That is: the universe tends 
towards disinformation:  
The species Homo sapiens, life on earth, the earth itself will finally 
follow the world’s general tendency to lose information and be 
dissolved (second law of thermodynamics). And such information 
decay is more fundamental than information production because 
information is produced through improbable accidents and decay 
occurs through probable accidents.58  
 
For Flusser, human history consists of the arrival at further abstractions into media in 
order to make sense of the world through information. When this world becomes too 
intense or complex to be understood a system is produced that takes the previous into 
consideration but more succinctly or effectively arrives at random possibilities. Technical 
images are the final step of these continuous abstractions. Technical images are so 
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abstracted from our experience that we are in fact almost totally alienated from producing 
with them: most of the work is done by the apparatus, which relegates us as functionaries. 
Our function is to create informed objects, objects which allow us to resist the second law 
of thermodynamics: 
Taken as a system, nature is one in which information tends 
progressively to disintegrate according to the second principle of 
thermodynamics. Man opposes this natural tendency towards 
entropy not only by acquiring, storing and transmitting 
information, but also (and in this he differs from all other 
organisms) by intentionally producing information. This 
specifically human, anti-natural faculty is "spirit," and it results in 
"culture," that is, in objects which have improbable forms, in 
"informed objects.”59 
 
The second law of thermodynamics is a cornerstone of Flusser’s thinking. The law states 
that the universe tends towards a state of entropy. Essentially, whenever heat is 
transferred between objects, some of it dissipates, or is lost. As that happens there is an 
increase in entropy (“randomness”) and a move towards further homogeneity of the 
universe: “The second law of thermodynamics suggests that the emerging particle 
universe tends toward an increasingly probable situation, toward disinformation, that is, 
to a steadily more even distribution of particles, until form is finally lost altogether.”60   
A simple way of thinking about this problem is picturing an ink droplet 
dissipating through a cup of water: that’s simply the most likely statistical scenario, that 
the particles of the droplet would go in random directions rather than towards a central, 
unified position. Another way of thinking about it considering a room which is very 
neatly organized: if anything is moved it is likely that it will be put out of place. A room 
which is highly disorganized will probably not change at all if a random object is moved 
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in a random direction: it will likely stay a mess. As a result, the most likely scenario for 
the universe is one of total homogeneity, in which particles are spread equally throughout 
the universe. In the lexicon in the back of “Towards a Philosophy of Photography,” 
Flusser defines entropy as “the tendency towards increasingly probable configurations.”61 
Entropy is guaranteed, and it’s essentially informational death. It is coming for us. The 
second law of thermodynamics “suggests that the emerging particle universe tends 
toward an increasingly probable situation, toward disinformation, that is, to a steadily 
more even distribution of particles, until form is naturally lost altogether”.62 This is to say 
that, without intervention, heat tends to dissipate between objects and spaces, ultimately 
(and inevitably) leading to a world of complete sameness. This infinitely probable state is 
one of no information, and hence one without humanity. Heat death is a state of complete 
informational sameness, where everything is a soup spread throughout every space: “The 
last stage, heat death, is a probability bordering on the inevitable, and this stage can be 
calculated in advance with a probability bordering on certainty.” Probability is what 
connects information, the apparatus, and the functionary, and it is where a breach for 
intention (and hence humanity) opens up in the most desperate way. We create 
information with the apparatus, and hence open up a space in which we cannot only 
express our will against entropy, but also our desire to connect beyond what is 
informationless and filled with sameness. With the apparatus, not only do we abstract and 
search for who we are in a relentless, particle-filled, data-driven universe, but we also  
reach out, we touch from a distance: 
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If one interprets the negentropic tendency of human communication 
instead of trying to explain it, then it appears in a different light. In this 
case, the accumulation of information is not seen as a process that is 
statistically improbable but possible. Rather, it is seen as a human 
intention— not as the result of accident and necessity, but of freedom. The 
storage of acquired information is not an exception to the law of 
thermodynamics (such as in information sciences), but rather, it is the 
perverse intention of a human being condemned to death.63  
 
A homogenous universe is one in which particles are spread equally throughout all spaces 
-- it is by definition a non-informational universe. Flusser would put that things have not 
been “in--formed,” they are the same: “the cosmos is, for us quite spontaneously, an 
apparatus which contains an original piece of information within its input (“the big 
bang”), and which is programmed necessarily to realize all of this information by chance, 
and thus exhaust it (“thermic death”).”64 There can be no history if the system is 
homogeneous, therefore this state is both post and pre-historic. A final state of entropy is 
guaranteed. As a result, we are given a way to fight this non-informational world of our 
certain death. The way in which we fight against it is by informing objects. Informing 
objects is the ultimate human labor: 
Tools as such are objects which remove other objects from nature 
to put them where we are - in order to produce them. In doing so, 
They change the original form of those objects, impose a new form 
on them; in other words, tools inform objects. The removed objects 
thus acquire an anti-natural, improbable form, and they become 
cultural objects. This productive and informative action is called 
"to work," and its result is called "a work." Some works, such as 
apples, for example, have been produced without having been very 
much informed. Other works, such as shoes, for example, have 
been highly informed in the course of their production: their form 
is highly improbable to animal skins (leather). So, scissors which 
remove apples from trees are tools which inform very little, 
because apples on a plate look very much like apples on a tree; on 
the other hand, needles which remove leather shoes from animal 
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skins are tools which inform very much. Is it thus true that the 
photographic camera is a kind of needle simply because 
photographs carry very much information?65  
 
This is how the camera and computer come together: despite their differences, the 
photographic image and computing were actually always joined at the hip. Producing 
technical images (that is, images created by a machine or apparatus) is primarily a 
computational process: it involves a user (“functionary”) pressing keys in order to 
puncture particles out of space. The place from which the functionary punctures these 
particles is many times over alienated, and many times over abstracted from his own 
subjectivity. But where did that subjectivity start for Flusser? Was there a period of 
happy triumphant human spirit? This is hardly the case. Flusser summarizes the history of 
human culture and communication as a series of abstractions and alienations. As a result, 
the place in which we find ourselves is the most deeply alienated and most abstracted: we 
have taken several steps away from an immediate connection to the world into a place in 
which we probe for meaning with machines through the sorting of particles, particles 
which collide against each other in increasingly random ways, eventually into oblivion.  
Flusser abstracts a time during which people live in a state of nature in a similar 
tradition to Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke. The state of nature is a period during which 
people have no contact with “information” per se. That is to say, they behave in purely 
instinctual and unmediated manners -- there is nothing in between them and nature -- no 
laws, no tools, no conflict other than the immediate danger posed by the physical world. 
This is the first distinct era of human development and the first step/dimensions of human 
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experience.66 From here, Flusser develops each of the steps that lead towards the 
technical image, the apparatus, the functionary, and the modern information society that 
we live in today. Each step in the development of information towards today is called a 
further “abstraction” from our original existence. Each abstraction, as a result, takes us 
further away from the state of nature, while at the same time taking us deeper into a mode 
of thinking which allows for a particular type of probing, one which, it seems, allows us 
to inform in different ways, even if these ways are more and more tenuous. By inform is 
meant gathering within the bounds of a particular abstraction. Flusser often uses the roots 
of words as key parts of his argument.  Take, for example, his exploration of the roots of 
apparatus: 
The Latinate term ,"apparatus" stems from the verb "apparare," which is 
"to prepare." Latin also contains the verb "praeparare," however; the 
difference is one of prefixes: "ad" ancf "prae." The most available 
translation for "apparare" in English would be "to make ready." In this 
sense, an apparatus would be an object which makes itself ready for 
something, while a "preparation" would be an object which patiently waits 
for something. The camera makes itself ready to take pictures, tries to 
ambush them, is on the lurk for them. This Iying-in-wait for something, 
this predatory character of the apparatus, must be understood in our 
attempt to define "apparatus" etymologically. (TAPOP 15). 
 
The same sort of explanation is possible in the realm of the word “inform.” To 
inform is not only to make information available, but also to gather in an abstract 
realm disparate particles that once brought together create new possibilities. The 
production of these cultural possibilities is the realm of freedom for Flusser: it is 
the realm in which we can fight out mechanization in order to express both our 
humanity and need to communicate, but it is also a place in which we can 
“sabotage” the apparatus towards showing its inherent machine-like existence. 
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With this sabotage we are able to de-humanize the growing informational 
apparatus which threatens to out-human us with its incessant and ever more 
confusing number of creations. 
Each of these progressive inventions alienates us from the world (pure 
existence/lack of subjectivity) while along the way losing a “dimension.” It is also called 
an alienation or mediation from that original experience.67 By losing a dimension it is 
meant that each progressive mode of mediation, although more focused and perhaps able 
to contain denser information, is also more compact and directed in its storage 
mechanism/media, and hence in its mediative/transformative power. This is to say, the 
traditional picture can show you a wolf, but a cave wall cannot quite tell you a 
complicated story with much nuance. A text might tell you a story with nuance, but it is 
dependent on a linear and thus more abstract mode of mediation. The computer might 
show you a story of unimaginable complexity, including data points from the beginning 
of time. Yet how abstracted is the computer? What kind of images does it tell and how do 
they relate to our original stance as unmediated beings? In short -- the more abstract we 
get, the more can be contained within the media we devise. And yet where do we find 
ourselves as we tumble into abstractions? 
The levels of abstraction that lead to today are as follows. First, the most primitive 
humans, before advanced language, experienced the world, strictly as concrete and direct 
stimulus. They are “Animals and “primitive” people are immersed in an animate world, a 
four-dimensional space-time continuum of animals and primitive peoples. It is the level 
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of concrete experience.”68 They have no capability for abstraction of information and to 
extrapolate on concepts. Flusser calls this first level of information, that of the state of 
nature, a space of unmediated experience. Every stimulus or event is seen as some sort of 
direct, unfiltered contact. There is mystical thinking, magical thinking, or community 
other than in an animalistic sense. This is a world of many “dimensions,” insofar as 
nothing is really strange and the only sort of human action is response or instinct. What 
happens next defines Flusser’s study.  
Next, imbued with an innate ability to communicate and overwhelmed by the 
“realness” of their experience, some humans begin to strike for means of mediation in 
order to make sense of their experience. They first begin to shape tools and materials in 
the world around them: “The kinds of human beings that preceded us (approximately two 
million to forty thousand years ago) stood as subjects facing an objective situation, a 
three-dimensional situation comprising graspable objects. This is the level of grasping 
and shaping, characterized by objects such as stone blades and carved figures.”.69 This 
primitive human begins to capture materials from the outer world and mimic their own 
movements through tools: “Machines are simulated organs of the body. The lever, for 
example, is an extended arm. It increases the ability of the arm to lift and ignores all the 
other functions the arm has. It is more ‘stupid’ than the arm, but it therefore reaches 
further and lifts heavier loads”70 71 
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70 TPOP gives a brilliant, concise definition of the concept of the tool in Flusser’s thinking: “A tool is a 
simulation of an organ of the body in the service of work… and work is the activity which produces and 
informs objects.” For example, Flusser finds a pair of sneakers is a highly pregnant informational object, 
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42 
The primary way in which they do this is by painting or etching on the walls of 
caves. But cave paintings have a non-linear, eternal recurrence nature to them. A cave 
painting showing a fire, a wolf, a few people, and a tree can be read in a multitude of 
ways, some of them mundane, some of them mystical, neither more right or wrong than 
the other. One might look at the cave painting and decide that the wolf should be looked 
at 3 or 4 times for the story to come together. One might decide the wolf is already dead. 
Neither wrong. So the cave painting does allow previously unmediated humans to use a 
surface upon which to reflect, that is, upon which to abstract and mediate themselves as a 
way of understanding themselves and their world. An animal in the forest that might pose 
a threat, it exists according to its location and its actual presence. A sculpture of that 
animal (an abstracted, mediated version of the animal), can communicate and point us to 
its existence, as human mediated shadow of the actual animal, reduced to three 
dimensions, that of length, width and height. Traditional images such as cave paintings, 
further reduce the dimensions of communication to two: length and width, allowing us to 
express more, but further removed from what the animal actually “was.” In this way a 
cave painting could represent an object out in the concrete world as a guide, as a map. 
But the map is confusing. Just how do we read these pictorial involvements? Just what 
were these early humans searching for in their drawings? These cave paintings are what 
give rise to hieroglyphs. The traditional image, for instance, is a “two-dimensional 
mediation zone between [the subject] and its environment”.72 This mediation, a realm of 
magic and eternal recurrence, is also a mode of alienation, in that it allows early humans 
                                                                                                                                            
(the steam engine), the apparatus mimics and replaces vision and intelligence itself. Before, we were 
thinkers, now, apparatuses think for us while we peer through them.  
71 Flusser. The Shape of Things 51. 
72 Flusser. Into 6. 
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to explain themselves, but only in so far as they remove themselves from the environment 
which they were trying to explain.  
In the next phase, when this eternal recurrence and elusiveness of the cave 
painting becomes too overwhelming, another abstraction occurs: someone begins to place 
the pictorial symbols in order, creating a primitive version of linear writing. The most 
basic example of this would be Egyptian hieroglyphics. Linear writing causes a further 
level of abstraction and mediation, taking us one step further from our original existence. 
Linear writing introduces a brand new concept: that of causality. This is “a zone to which 
human beings owe most of their insights” (Into the Universe, 7). Putting things in order 
finally allows humans not only to mirror their experience through mediation, but also to 
get farther and farther away from merely descriptive means of mediation. In losing the 
dimension of the image, writing allows humans to go beyond the wall, beyond the 
pictorial. If the statue was once removed, and the painting once more, then writing is 
thrice removed from the original. Yet writing can go so much further: unlike with the 
pictorial, the early human writer is no longer tied to concepts that require the two 
dimensions of the wall. The early human writer has stepped down another level of 
abstraction, another level of alienation: he is now in a one-dimensional (backwards and 
forwards) system of information, linear writing. This ability to go in one direction allows 
the early human writer to probe depths completely unavailable to the drawer. This is a 
momentous occasion: the birth of history, and the birth of technology. The early writer 
uses writing in order to make sense of the increasingly complicated cave paintings, but is 
only able to do so by losing a dimension and by getting further away from them.  
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Keep in mind that this is a fall by definition: once writing is invented, there is no 
going back. Just like the invention of cave paintings created a subject which was a 
drawer, the creation of writing creates a writer: someone who thinks linearly, someone 
who can abstract away from mere occurrences, someone who can “think.” People created 
writing, and in doing so created a space (or more precisely, a medium) into which they 
could abstract and therefore have a linear, causal consciousness. For Flusser, nothing 
from before the creation of linear writing can be truly remembered, first because it’s not 
clear that there was a developed concept of causality prior to writing. As a result, nothing 
from before the invention of linear writing actually “happened,” it “merely occurred” in 
an unexplainable way. This is similar to the way in which very young children experience 
the world: they don’t yet have a steady consciousness which allows them to abstract 
causality. As a result, children under a certain age only have two modes of existence: 
happy and content, or utter, sheer terror. That’s because these children don’t really 
understand what is happening, but rather feel it as a horrifying, unexplainable and 
potentially fatal event. It must have been much the same to primitive, pre-literate humans. 
The abstraction of writing and the alienation from our experience is what allowed us to 
explain how things happen, it is what allowed us to look deeper within ourselves, even if 
only in an alienated, abstract space. It is the birth of history, and as history progressed 
writing became more and more convoluted, better able to explain causality and abstract 
concepts, but farther and farther from something that was immediately and directly 
connected to us. We became confused because of the sheer, terrifying number of 
sentences, books, and articles. There is a toll on the subject to this continuing investment 
in linear writing. Writing takes humans into a world where many advancements are 
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possible: communication from a distance, scientific texts, the gradual compounding of 
information, the spread and sharing of knowledge. As a result, the level of abstraction 
(the directions in which they probe and the abstract concepts which they find) becomes 
increasingly more overwhelming. People become so far removed from their original, 
unmediated lives that writing becomes their world. People’s every moment and care 
becomes entangled in a severely abstracted, heavily mediated world of linear concepts.  
Finally, as a result, humans began to look for a way of making sense of 
increasingly complicated and abstracted linear texts. This led to the final fall from 
existence, a final embrace of abstraction, and the final step in mediation: the invention of 
the apparatus, the first example of which is the camera. When texts cease making sense, 
the subject alienates himself one last time by losing linearity and condensing into 
particles: the technical image/camera is invented.73 The technical image, unlike the 
writing, is not limited to a linear space. The technical image is, in reality, a deeply 
concentrated accidental object pregnant with meaning and deception. Just like the linear 
text allowed man to make sense of a world of confusing and overwhelming separate 
pictures, the apparatus/camera becomes further alienated and further abstracted by cutting 
out linearity entirely. The apparatus does not deal with the linear, but rather with the 
singular. Whereas the linear writer created a history that probed to some depth, the 
functionary uses the camera/apparatus to probe something even deeper: a mere instant 
                                                
73 By “texts ceasing to make sense” Flusser means something quite profound: he means that texts finally 
reached a level of abstraction so deep that our minds could no longer bear it. This is easily illustrated by 
very advanced scientific writing, even that of the 19th century pre-technical image. Certain areas of physics 
and other hard sciences expressed such disturbing, abstracted concepts that they indeed became dangerous. 
Case in point: Galileo, Newton, among many other scientists who were deemed dangerous due to their 
findings. Of course, the logic of linear writing is responsible for the possibility of science, but an immediate 
conflation between writing and science is actually a mistake, because linear writing is not a root cause, but 
rather a derivative of the image. Words are images, and logic is image based. It is through images that we 
abstract into spaces and media, and it is through abstracted images (contained in a medium that is made of 
something other than its original form) that we are able to think.  
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captured as data. Whereas the writer wrote, the functionary/data gatherer merely presses a 
button, and with that captures universes of particles. It is no wonder, then, that the 
apparatus signals the end of history; the end of linear writing74. The button is a 
disturbing, seemingly simple device that seems to put the functionary/man in control, but 
this is deceptive. The functionary does not quite grasp the apparatus entirely; even a child 
can operate a camera. As a result, the apparatus calls upon the functionary to find the 
possibilities within it to generate ever more random events of improbability. The 
functionary becomes, as a result, a heavily abstracted user seeking to explain his own life 
and experience through the use of an apparatus he does not understand which 
punctures/captures moments of data from an otherwise continuous world. But the 
apparatus is overwhelmingly complicated, much like the depths of data and existence, 
which it is seeking to explore.  
There is an odd beauty to the way Flusser entangles each mode of information 
with each of its particular user: the mode of information creates the user. The human who 
painted caves is a new man; the human who wrote texts became a new man, influenced 
by the texts and its alienated heft while also probing into worlds far from what he saw 
with his/her eyes; the human who looks through the camera or types in his computer is 
yet again a new human, one who sits in front of an apparatus searching for meaning in a 
vast landscape of data points and abstractions. Each creation of a new media is a deeply 
                                                
74 The death of writing is not meant in a vulgar, idiotic sense: of course you can still write. Of course you 
can still go into a cabin into the woods and devise some sort of linear text. Of course one can still explain 
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the camp of knowing that linear writing, and the kind of thinking made possible by linear writing, is 
imminently discardable. Why is there such a craze for STEM fields? Why are the humanities deemed 
unimportant? Why are we convinced that we will never have a writer like Shakespeare, Milton, or Dante 
walk the earth again? The reason is simple: we no longer have a need for them. 
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felt, completely transformative loss of dimension and also a moment of creation of a new 
man, a man descending a step-ladder which creates for him a new mind, one which 
abstracts itself further and further into the next age of information, and a new subject is 
called upon at each level. It is worth quoting Flusser at length here: 
According to the suggested model of cultural history, we are about to leave the 
one-dimensionality of history for a new, dimensionless level, one to be called, 
for lack of a more positive designation, “posthistory.” The rules that once 
sorted the universe into processes, concepts into judgments, are dissolving. The 
universe is disintegrating into quanta, judgments into bits of information. In 
fact, the rules are dissolving exactly because we followed them into the core 
of both the universe and our own consciousness. At the core of the universe, 
particles no longer follow the rules (e.g., chain reactions) and begin to buzz, 
and at the core of consciousness, we try to sift out the calculable basis of our 
thinking, feeling, and desire (e.g., proposition theory, decision theory, and the 
calculation of behavior in actemes); that is, linearity is decaying 
spontaneously, and not because we decided to throw away the rules. And so we 
have no choice but to risk a leap into the new. And it is truly a risk. For as 
waves dissolve into drops, judgments into bytes, actions into actemes, a void 
appears, namely, the void of the intervals that hold the elemental points apart 
and the no-dimensionality and so impossibility of measuring the points 
themselves. One cannot live in such an empty and abstract universe, with 
such a dissociated and abstract consciousness. To live, one must try to make 
the universe and consciousness concrete. One must try to consolidate the 
particles to make them substantial (graspable, conceivable, tangible)75   
 
In short, we make that consciousness concrete by reaching out with the apparatus, by 
grasping particles and making them into technical images. The entire history of human 
culture and information, along with its abstractions (and its users) are as follows: 1) the 
original man, who only interacts with his environment; 2) the cave painter, who can see 
the magic and eternal recurrence of the traditional image, but who eventually becomes 
overwhelmed by the images and places them next to each other in an effort to make sense 
of them, creating 3) the linear writer, who has abstracted himself into a world of one 
dimension, of the line, a line which is not contained by two dimensions, and which 
therefore can probe places which are abstract, surreal, perhaps even terrifying, bringing 
                                                
75 Flusser. Into the Universe 15. 
  
48 
the man a glimpse of things he cannot see with his eyes but which he knows inform the 
very essence of his existence, and finally, the 4) functionary, a media user who has 
abstracted further from the linear dimension, and who now uses the apparatus in order to 
probe an increasingly more disturbing and deeply alienated place: that of data and 
particles. Much like the writer, the functionary knows that the data is meaningful, and 
that it is bringing him closer and closer to the thing he was trying to explain. Although 
more alienated than ever, the functionary is living in a world of deep, cohesive, 
overwhelming reality: data is unquestionable. This is why we feel compelled to inform 
with the apparatus: we know that the way it informs is completely bulletproof. The 
apparatus is a machine, and hence human subjectivity is subtracted from it; we inherently 
trust pictures more than paintings. The particles gathered by the apparatus are 
overwhelming, celebratory. They allow us to come into contact with each other in ways, 
which are nearly absurd when one stops to think it through. One can take a picture and 
immediately have it appear across the world. That sort of transmission is what telematics 
is about. It is about gathering abstracted particles towards a mutual play that celebrates 
our ability to coexist and engage in a dialog in images. It is as if we are picking from an 
infinite harvest of particle information.  
Data, here meaning raw data and not its interpretation, does not have a human 
element. Data is produced by the apparatus, and is therefore eminently trustworthy. 
Finally, unlike the previous steps of alienation, which called upon the new media user to 
behave a certain way, data creates a slightly more nuanced world. Because the tool of 
data is the apparatus, which is a black box with its own, immutable scientific rules, the 
user is now defined more violently and more forcefully than ever before. Yes, the writer-
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human was defined by writing. But the functionary is defined in a completely suffocating 
and disturbing way, because, unlike the pen, the apparatus has a mind of its own. The 
apparatus gathers data in a way that is not entirely controllable by the user. As such, the 
user is now more under control than actually in control. The functionary has the intuitive 
understanding that he is grasping at meaning through the technical image, which should 
not be limited to the image produced by a camera; the spreadsheet, the database, the 
computer screen are technical images that also control the functionary and impel him 
towards further probing. The functionary also has the intuitive understanding, however, 
that in gathering data he is in a world of utter and bizarre abstraction, looking at points 
which seem to come from a nearly infinite and inexhaustible set of points, the entirety of 
experience and time.  
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The Faux Telematic Utopia of the Technical Image/Superbrain 
Whereas the linear text makes sense of the traditional image; the camera makes 
sense of the linear text and as a result of science, logic, and history, which were born with 
the linear text. But the level of abstraction of the apparatus allows it to reach much farther 
than the linear text. Case in point, the apparatus has allowed scientists to reach into the 
depths of the history of our universe, taking “technical images” (be these pictorial or 
merely data points) which reveal concepts which would be utterly baffling to the cave 
drawing man or the early linear writer. Yet the steps in abstraction have allowed us to 
reach a point not only of more concrete knowledge (data gathered by apparatuses), but 
crucially the apparatus has also taken us towards a point of complete and total alienation. 
The modern functionary intuitively knows that he does not understand the apparatus, be it 
the computer or the camera, and that no matter how hard he tries, he will never exhaust 
the data contained within the apparatus. Yet the apparatus, which has a mind of its own 
and which impels the functionary towards abstracted exploration, beckons the 
functionary. The apparatus then controls the functionary. It asks the functionary to keep 
probing, probing into an increasingly murky sea of possibilities, facts, and connections. 
According to Google CEO Eric Schmidt, every two days we created the same amount of 
information that was created from the dawn of time up to 2003.76  
Yet it feels as if we aren’t getting closer to any sort of end or totality. In fact, with 
each passing year new methods of apparatus use, creation, and data gathering are created. 
As a result, the functionary (i.e., the modern human who uses the internet and a smart-
phone) is called upon by an apparatus he/she does not understand in order to create more 
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and more data, the use of which is not clear or illuminating… And yet there is an odd, 
exhausting pleasure to the experience, in which the modern functionary is controlled by 
the apparatus and still wants more. The brilliance of the apparatus is not that it forces us 
into control, but rather that it creates a world in which we only find meaning by being 
under control. To not be on the internet, to not be searching databases and sending 
versions of ourselves in databases is, in a very real and unavoidable way, to not exist. 
The traditional image is mediated by something that is ultimately one step 
removed from the world of experience and data: human subjectivity. This is to say: in 
order for a painting to exist physically, it must first be painted. In order for a painting to 
be painted, it must first go through the subjectivity of a human being, and hence be 
interpreted and changed from whatever situation or concept originally inspired it out in 
the “unmediated” world of existence and the real. The technical image removes the 
human element. The human involvement is relegated to a completely marginal and 
ultimately miniscule role: that of pressing the shutter or key. As a result, the technical 
image is inherently trustworthy. When you see an image taken by a photochemical black 
and white camera, the “thing” you are seeing in the paper is a physical byproduct of a 
definite, robust, and unchanging object: the apparatus. The difference between the 
traditional image and the technical image is the following: the technical image requires 
the absence (or relegated) presence of the human. The technical image requires that we 
accept that true, topical meaning to our world is now created in our absence. A second 
line of criticism is that the picture can be played with or otherwise tricked into showing 
something that is not there. But this is patently false, because the point of the technical 
image (the “photographic picture”) is precisely that it is not pictorial, that it is not image 
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based but rather based on data. Because it is based on data, and because of the growing 
connectivity and ability of the different cybernetic apparatuses, production of information 
has moved farther and farther away from human control. As a result, this monumental 
amount of information, which is at once difficult to comprehend, is also increasingly less 
and less human. They are abstractions completely alienated from our understanding, both 
in scope and in their origin: 
The technical image is one produced by an apparatus. Apparatus, in turn, 
are products of applied scientific texts, making technical images indirect 
products of scientific texts. The historical and ontological position of 
technical images is different from the one occupied by traditional images 
precisely because they are the indirect results of applied scientific texts. 
Historically, traditional images were anterior to texts for tens of thousands 
of years, and technical images succeed to I advanced texts. Ontologically, 
traditional images are first-degree abstractions, since they were abstracted 
from the concrete world. Technical images, for their part, are. third-degree 
abstractions; they are abstracted from texts, which- in turn are abstracted 
from images which were themselves abstracted from the concrete world. 
Again historically, traditional images may be called "pre-historical," while 
technical images may be called "post-historical," in the sense suggested 
previously. Ontologically, traditional images mean phenomena, while 
technical images mean concepts. Deciphering technical images implies a 
reading of their position.77 (TAPOP, 10) 
 
What you see when you look at a black and white film photo is not an image, but rather 
the result of light hitting a photo-sensitive material and then being exposed to chemicals 
for the precise amount of time needed for the material to resolve in a way which is visible 
to our eyes. Hence the idea that a manipulated image is still “true” -- it is showing us the 
byproduct of a technological process. Whether or not that technological process took 
place in one, two, or three steps, multiple exposures, collages, or otherwise, is immaterial. 
The same is true of 3D models and technical images which are not taken by a film photo 
camera: they are the byproduct of a technological process which expresses the 
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relationship between data points. The data points in the case of the film photo are: camera 
location, camera angle, shutter speed, lens length, exposure time, framing decision, and 
so on. Each variation in one of those attributes creates a new technical image, a new set 
of data points. To say that a 3D image created by a computer, say, an AutoCAD model, is 
less “real” than a film photo is preposterous: as the byproduct of a set of technological 
processes and relations, the AutoCAD image is closer to its abstract self (i.e. its existence 
as data) than the film photo is, which was alienated through the process of being 
developed.78 Both are technical images. To say that something which is closer to its 
nature (the AutoCAD image) is “faker” than something which looks more like the real 
world to us (the black and white photo) is intellectually lazy.  
It is the sign of someone that wants to believe that a photo (a technical image) is 
just a photo because it looks like something we know and understand. In fact, anyone that 
knows anything about photography knows that color photos are less real than black and 
white photos, because the color in color film has nothing to do with color in real life, and 
everything to do with different chemicals being used in developing a different type of 
film. As a result, color in photos never look like real life, because they are real life, but 
rather another technological abstraction. Black and white photos, on the other hand, are 
closer to real life, because they are less technological abstracted. Hence the haunting and 
powerful, “real” nature of black and white photos, which look much more real than color 
photos to those who are willing to look closely enough. Looking closely means looking 
beyond what is just right in front of your eyes, and looking into the processes that created 
the object before you. Anyone that looks like that cannot come to the conclusion that a 
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photograph is “just an image,” just like that person looking closely cannot come to the 
conclusion that painting and a technical image are the same: they are different levels of 
abstraction probing towards a completely different level of knowledge. To make a final 
point and exhaust all sense of doubt, one must simply accept that the black and white 
photo as a technical image is not pictorial, despite the fact that it looks like that and that 
it’d be easier for us if that were the case. Things are not what they seem. The photo is 
data; and the pictorial illusion is a mediated byproduct of that data. We are subservient to 
these processes as functionaries. 
As functionaries, we have certain drives and tendencies, but our choices are 
severely limited: we can only take photos which are possible. The number of possible 
photos is large, but it is not infinite: 
Considering the camera (or any apparatus, for that matter) from 
such an angle. we can see that it is meant to produce symbols. It 
produces symbolical surfaces according to some prescription 
contained within it. The camera has been programmed to produce 
photographs and every photograph is the realization of one of the 
virtualities contained in that program. The sum of those virtualities 
is large, but not infinite. It is the sum of all those photographs 
which may be taken by this camera. Granted a camera may take 
almost infinitely the same or similar photographs, again and again 
and again - but this is not very interesting. Such photographs are 
"redundant": they carry no new information; they are superfluous. 
For our purposes, we can forget such redundant photographs. 
restricting ourselves to informative photographs alone; thus. the 
majority of "snapshots" as such are here eliminated from 
consideration.79  
 
But why are informational technical images to be desired? Why are they something worth 
dedicating our lives to? The answer is simple: survival. By gathering these particles (by 
informing them) we can create accidental (more on this later) objects which go ever 
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slightly against entropy. Technical images, in their deeply informed character, are 
negentropic: they negate entropy.  Were we to wait in an entropic state for the apparition 
of a photograph, we would be waiting a long time. And yet the apparatus can create a 
large number of technical images instantaneously. It is as if the apparatus fights entropy: 
it creates these accidents of information in blazing speed, sorting information in a state of 
high tension, going against the uninformed state of entropy. In his faux-utopia (faux 
because it is a place in which we are completely consumed by images, and therefore 
barely human), Flusser predicts that we will celebrate this negentropic tendency: 
For the first time, people will be in a position to methodically generate 
information, and not only empirical information, using a technology 
modeled on perception. Information will then surge like a rising tide 
against entropy. If we define human beings by their negentropic tendency, 
then this is when they will become truly human for the first time, that is, 
players with information; and the telematic society, this “information 
society” in the true sense of the word, will be the first genuinely free 
society.80 (ITUOTI, 94) 
 
We puncture these particles in order to create technical images, abstractions which we 
probe in order to understand a certain type of historical alienation, the alienation that 
arises when the world becomes composed of particles and data rather than linearity. 
Hence the lack of true literary geniuses today. Despite a world population far exceeding 
that of the late 1500s, and despite a greater than ever ease of access to information, we 
have yet to give birth to another Shakespeare, Dante, or Cervantes. The reason is simple: 
important information is no longer created linearly, but rather captured out of the ether 
through apparatuses that puncture particles into informed images. 
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Computation; the use of technical images; these are extremely abstracted, deeply 
alienated states for Flusser. He believes us to reside in a state of flabbergasting confusion, 
a period in which we find ourselves to be frantic producers of accidental objects which 
give us purpose, and have pregnant within them the possibility of communication and 
survival, but which send us in a frenzy and come to define us in ways that threaten our 
subjectivity and indeed our freedom: 
There are signs everywhere that we are fast approaching a 
cybernetically governed society, that society, in fact, has already 
begun to change into a cybernetically governed one. There can be 
no doubt that the structure of the emerging society increasingly 
resembles that of a brain. The notion of technical images as a kind 
of secretion of a global nervous system, the dreaming of a 
superbrain, comes to mind. And these secretions, these dreams, can 
be grasped as the cybernetic governance of brain function. In short, 
the notion that arises here is that of a dreaming global brain 
controlled cybernetically through technical images. That would be 
a metaphor for the telematic society, and it may not even be so 
metaphorical as it first appears.81  
 
By control, Flusser doesn’t mean propaganda in the ideological sense; that in which some 
evil party is controlling us. Rather, he means instead that our relationship with our world 
and indeed ourselves is now mediated by apparatuses that critically narrow our range of 
experiences and possibilities. In Marx, a crude way of explaining alienation is thus: in 
some prehistoric time, man had a direct connection with the earth -- if he wanted 
something, he simply plucked it from a tree or found it somewhere.82 In an alienated 
world, man no longer has a connection to earth, but rather is connected through a 
machine: the machine interfaces with the earth, while man interfaces with the machine. 
Man presses buttons instead. This dialectical relationship is somewhat mirrored in 
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Flusser, only we are alienated not from mother earth, but from our own subjectivity: we 
begin to think through the apparatus, mainly because the apparatus teaches us to see the 
world through it.  
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Conclusion 
We can press all the keys we want, but we cannot press keys which do not exist. 
Gilles Deleuze, in a late essay titled “Postscript to the Societies of Control”, gives a broad 
and far less developed warning against these mechanisms of control. His own theory with 
regards to control will be further analyzed later in this essay, but for now I’d like to quote 
one specific Deleuze passage having to do with the ephemeral nature of control. Control 
works precisely because it is an illusion of choices, choices which make us feel like an 
“artist” (emphasis mine): 
Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society—
not that machines are determining, but because they express those 
social forms capable of generating them and using them. The old 
societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines—levers, 
pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped 
themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive 
danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies 
of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose 
passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the 
introduction of viruses… It’s a capitalism of higher-order 
production. It no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the 
finished products: it buys the finished products or assembles parts. 
What it wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy is stocks. 
This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, 
which is to say, for being sold or marketed. Thus it is essentially 
dispersive, and the factory has given way to the corporation… 
Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also 
continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long 
duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man 
enclosed, but man in debt.83 
 
Yet, this limited, alienated, abstracted condition is one in which there is a sense of 
possibility, an utopian possibility, even. Up until a certain point in our history, 
information was centrally controlled: books, television, etc. Flusser writes that with the 
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rise of the apparatus, even with all of its alienations, a new possibility emerges: that of 
the telematic society.  
Flusser describes two potential societies ruled by the apparatus:  
One moves toward a centrally programmed, totalitarian society of 
image receivers and image administrators, the other toward a 
dialogic, telematic society of image producers and image 
collectors.84  
 
Flusser claims that the telematic society is an utopian world in which communication 
through technical images allows us to connect without having to respond to a central 
authority and to live in a highly functional way. A telematic society is one in which the 
power of image creation contained in the apparatus is harnessed towards human 
communication. The benefit is that society becomes more democratic. Rather than simply 
accepting information from a centrally controlled power (say, the church, or a 
government), we can now be creators who work together. This is a utopian of a certain 
sort: rather than passive receivers, people become creators. The problem arises with the 
question of control and programming. Through the mechanism of the apparatus we are 
made robotic, and as a result get caught in an immense, never-ending web of sharing 
remixed images, a process Flusser calls both orgasmic and at the same time horrifying, 
because we cannot escape it. Hence the faux utopia – we are no longer passive receivers 
of information, but at what cost? 
This is ultimately a faux-utopia -- its possibilities are, in some ways, desirable. 
Compared to a centrally controlled information society, in which the average citizen is 
simply a suffering, passive receiver of information, the telematic society, with all of its 
rich visual culture and dialogic possibilities is more like a “fever dream.” In this dream, 
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we are reduced to the bare necessities of the apparatus (we become the ultimate 
functionaries), and as such are reduced to our digits (which point) and our brain, which 
remixes. The connection is so dialogic and so immediate that it is felt as an orgasmic 
immediacy, as if the entire world was a “global network.” 
In this utopian world, there are two possibilities left to the functionary who is self-
aware: he can either carve spaces within the apparatus which short-circuit it, creating a 
rift that allows human intention, which Flusser calls “freedom,” to ooze out of the blind 
spots of the apparatus. Another possibility is to commit suicide. Without any recourse but 
to disappear into our digits and brain, we are left with no alternative way in which to 
express our freedom. Flusser explains that everything that is not needed will be done 
away with. In order to be in a telematics world, all that is needed is our brain and our 
digits. Our brain imagines, remixes, and accepts images, while our digits point towards 
particles and press keys, be these keys on cameras or terminals. As a result, we will 
shrink to the bare essentials: we will be brain and digits sitting in terminals, connected in 
a constant and ecstatic torrent of image-based conversations which will function as if part 
of a neural network. The world will be a brain oozing images into existence, and we will 
be small particles dreaming of these images. There is an option, but it is an option of 
infinite and tremendous darkness (emphasis mine):  
Medicine (economy) should be the means of alleviating suffering 
when it does so to delay death and where the suffering cannot be 
alleviated, to remove the body. In a dialogically ordered society, 
death could no longer be distinguished from suicide: the decision 
to put a suffering body down—euthanasia—would be made in 
dialogue (e.g., between a doctor and the one who is suffering). 
I chose the example of medicine not only because it is so striking 
but above all because it emphasizes the cerebral nature of 
suffering. As long as corporeal processes (or economic processes 
of any sort) do not enter into consciousness, as long as they 
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proceed automatically, they can and should be ignored. To become 
interested in one’s own liver function, or in one’s morning toast, is 
to miss a chance to produce pictures. Should there be a 
programming error (the liver is forcing itself into consciousness by 
being painful or the burned toast by tasting terrible), one would 
feel obliged to reprogram, in cooperation with others. And when it 
becomes clear that such reprogramming is getting on people’s 
nerves (especially those nerves engaged in making pictures), there 
is an option to say no, to exercise one’s veto option and forget 
everything (die). For one will not be forgotten: artificial memories 
see to it that what was once called the “I” is stored so that it can be 
dialogically changed.85   
 
We start from the premise that the apparatus creates a new human, the functionary, a 
person that is impelled to operate the apparatus in order to probe for particles and data. 
The apparatus punctures particles and data out of the existing world, in a way that is 
technologically predicated and utterly reproducible. Because the apparatus impels us, it 
controls us. It asks us to be functionaries. Let us call this world the society of control. In 
the society of control, “we find ourselves no longer ascertainable by means of causal but 
only by means of functional explanations… because the photographic universe has 
programmed us to think in a post-historical fashion”.86  
History seems to have stopped, in the way that we thought about history before 
the photograph. The reason why history has stopped is because the amount of data has 
become utterly overwhelming. The additions which are made to the collected data points 
captured by technical images are informational and transmitted in scattershot and 
seemingly random ways. People feel lost -- they feel as if they operate the apparatus and 
yet never get ahead of it in any way. Apparatuses robotize humanity – they have a set of 
priorities built into them, and it is this “rigid, unintentional functional automaticity [that] 
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needs to be made the object of criticism”.87 The darkness behind the technical image, for 
Flusser, is that the functionary has to act by algorithm – hardly a spiritual enterprise: 
This results in a broader definition of a photograph: It is an image 
created and distributed automatically by programmed apparatuses 
in the course of a game necessarily based on chance, an image of a 
magic state of things whose symbols inform its receivers how to 
act in an improbable fashion.88  
 
The world of the technical image is one where our sense of our humanity has been 
threatened. It is a post-historical and nearly post-human world. This mechanization or 
functionarization of the human leads Flusser to argue that a “philosophy of photography” 
is necessary: “the task of a philosophy of photography is to reflect upon [a] possibility of 
freedom – and thus its significance – in a world dominated by apparatuses; to reflect 
upon the way in which, despite everything, it is possible for human beings to give 
significance to their lives in face of the chance necessity of death”.89 For the functionary 
there is only one mode of freedom in such an alienated environment: to press a shutter 
and find his own intention within a mechanized and functionally determined universe. 
Intention is a “criticism of functionalism in all its anthropological, scientific, political, 
and aesthetic aspects”.90 The philosophy of photography involves being able to program 
not only against the apparatus, but to fight the programming that the apparatus attempts 
to pin on us. Whether the telematic society will have any room for human freedom or not 
depends on our ability to program ourselves and the apparatus. The celebratory aspects of 
sharing technical images with one another require that we program ourselves away from 
the complicated tangles of the apparatus. 
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But not all is so easy. What makes matters worse for Flusser is the fact that the 
apparatus so violently redefines human activity, all the while being the last place in 
which humans can express their “humanity.” The apparatus does not present itself as an 
easy space for human connectivity, but rather as an object that redefines human activity 
from the start. Hence Flusser’s project starts from a dire necessity to dominate the 
apparatus, all the while navigating the new domain of human activity that the apparatus 
immediately imposes. The apparatus is fraught with traps. Its excitement beckons us to 
just create mindlessly. The goal, for Flusser, is to understand the apparatus as both the 
bearer of our destruction and the unlikely (and extremely improbable) domain of our 
salvation. But the apparatus, in its vast structural complexity, offers an immediate 
pleasure which seeks to undermine human intention. Without the proper understanding of 
the apparatus and its ability to create a (near mindless) functionary, humans are left to an 
empty pleasure of simply creating and creating, but this creative process is actually 
destructive: out of their amateurish ignorance, the unthinking functionary simply creates 
banal, uniformed, useless objects. This is the domain of the kitsch (emphasis mine):  
The maker of snapshots is different from the true photographer in that he 
takes pleasure in the structural complexity of his toy. In contradiction to 
the true photographer, as well as to the chess player, the amateur 
photographer does not search for "new moves," for real information, 
for the improbable; on the contrary, he would prefer his own function 
ever more and more through increasingly automated camera 
procedures. The automation of the camera, which to him is opaque, 
inebriates him. Clubs for amateur photographers, for example, are places 
where intoxication with the impenetrables of camera complexities occurs, 
places for "trips"; they are post- industrial opium dens.91 
 
For a functionary to find intention in the apparatus is, in short, resistance. Telematics is 
the celebration of resistance through communication and democratic acceptance of one 
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another. But it is a celebration in images, in a constant torrent of over-sharing and 
remixing. Whether that is a benefit or not, is up to each functionary to decide. 
In order to re-discover our humanity after we have become functionaries, we must 
probe with the apparatus within the nature of the apparatus itself, in order to reveal that 
although it determines us, there is more to use than to simply function, there is the 
possibility to use the apparatus in order to highlight human intention and in doing so to 
self-program. The functionary resists by functioning in spaces where the apparatus begins 
to fail. The use of photography is crucial to Flusser’s - and our - project because the 
photographic apparatus is the first of its kind; the first apparatus which re-configures the 
human primarily as a functionary. All further apparatuses dealing with technical images, 
among which we might include computers, databases, smart-phones, video-games, VR-
devices, and so on, function from the same premise as the photographic camera: the 
human is no longer a full-fledged agentic thinker, but rather a passive explorer whose 
only input is to press buttons or keys grasping particles. As a result, finding freedom 
within the photographic apparatus may lead us into new ways of thinking as to where 
freedom may exist in further technical image apparatuses: 
...if such a philosophy of photography were to succeed in its task, this 
success would be of importance not only in the realm of photography but 
also for post industrial society in general. The photographic universe is 
only one among many apparatus universes, and it is not the most 
dangerous one at that… the photographic universe may serve as a 
model for post-industrial existence in general, and that therefore, a 
philosophy of photography may serve as a point of departure for any 
philosophy which has the current, as well as the future form of human 
existence as its subject.92 
 
In those spaces, the human finds solace in the realization that there are 
things the human grasps that the apparatus was not designed to understand 
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or capture. Those who resist control are those who attempt “to create a 
space for human intention in a world dominated by apparatuses” (75). 
These functionaries seeking freedom are attempting to elude control. The 
camera demands that its possessor (or he possessed by it) constantly 
shoot photographs, constantly produce redundant pictures. This 
photographic mania - of the eternally reproduced, of the repetition of 
sameness (or of similarity) - reaches a point where the snap shooter feels 
blind if deprived of his camera: drug addiction. The snapshooter can no 
longer see the world unless he looks at it through a camera and through 
the categories of the camera program. He no longer transcends the camera, 
but is devoured by its greedy function. He becomes the camera's 
extended automatic shutter release. His behavior is an automatic 
function of the camera itself.93 
 
The photographic, but in reality computational society described above is a realm of 
control. Through the abundance and ubiquity of the apparatus, people have come to 
expect a world of constant and immediate connection. This is how they are controlled – 
through ubiquity and through the dialectical determination that the apparatus contains. 
Yet people feel an odd freedom in always pointing, in always snapping, in always being 
connected. They adapt to this flood of informed objects. People want to point; they want 
to click. Their desire is to capture, to round up, to give meaning, which they know in 
truth lies not in what they see, but in the massive and unending movement of near infinite 
particles, which they feel, but do not understand.  
The move towards constant connection and constant creation through the 
apparatus, is one of total and complete desperation. We know this intuitively.  A further 
problem arises once we realize that this flurry of mindless apparatus driven activity 
doesn’t actually help, other than in a superficial psychological way, that of being able to 
say “I have searched, I have produced, and therefore existed.” Un-informational objects, 
be they databases, photos, videos, or otherwise, are actually profoundly harmful. They 
obfuscate. They rise towards our eyes in a sea of sameness, nonsense, and despair. 
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Mindlessly created objects come back with a vengeance and threaten to suffocate us past 
their point of use (emphasis mine): 
Engaged against the degenerative cycle nature–culture–waste– 
nature, against the decay of information, human beings devise 
more and more durable supports, for example, plastic bottles 
instead of glass ones. But perversely, this halts the degenerative 
cycle not at the point of remembering but at the point of waste, of 
forgetting. The plastic bottle is discarded just as quickly as the 
glass one but lasts longer before returning to nature. Waste 
accumulated in this way contaminates the environment, seeps back 
into culture, and threatens to flood it with recycled, half-forgotten 
things, with kitsch. In answer to this threat, sciences of the 
discarded, such as ecology, archaeology, depth psychology, and 
etymology, have arisen alongside the sciences and humanities. 
They seek to recall the half forgotten, to master the discarded 
material, a typical posthistorical problematic.94 
 
Posthistorical also means that, through joined use of the apparatus, one is now able to be 
in constant re-imagining of the past. One is able to not only experience the past through 
images, but also to remix the past with new information. Hence posthistorical; outside of 
a history, because everything is immediately stored and immediately made accessible 
anyway. Such an existence is inherently alienated. Nonetheless, in the society of control, 
telematics is the only form of freedom left to us. Telematics is the democratic embrace of 
the cybernetic exchange of technical images as our fundamental purpose now that we 
have been made into machines by the apparatus. Through our ever-increasing march 
towards abstraction, we have arrived at a place in which meaning can only be created in 
our alienation: in order to see we must cover our eyes with lenses and screens. 
Flusser provides the “categorical” study of control by describing the history of 
media leading up to the apparatus. This proposes an idea of what resistance or freedom 
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within this system looks like: an affirmation of human intention through the use of the 
mechanizing informational apparatus that controls us. Put more simply: we are enslaved 
by the apparatus when we begin to use it; (it dialectically forces us into the position of a 
functionary), and the only way out is to embrace this functionary status in a search for 
freedom: 
What is involved here is not the classical problem of alienation, but 
an existential revolution for which we do not have any historical 
precedents. To put it brutally: what is involved here is the challenge of 
reconsidering the problem of freedom in an entirely new context. This is 
what a philosophy of photography would really address. If everything has 
had a cause, if everything will have an effect, if everything is 
"conditioned," where is there any room left for human freedom? All the 
answers to this question might be reduced, if radically simplified, to a 
common denominator: The causes are so extremely complex, and the 
effects are so extremely difficult to see in advance, that man (this limited 
being) may easily behave as if he were "unconditioned." Within our new 
context, however, the problem of freedom must be posed differently: If 
everything comes about by chance, and if everything comes to nothing, 
where is there any room left for human freedom? It is within this climate 
of the absurd where a philosophy of photography must formulate its 
question concerning freedom.95 
 
By necessity, functionaries that resist have to be about the productive power of the 
apparatus, and finding a way to harness that power towards crystalizing intention. 
A philosophy of photography is necessary if we are to lift photography 
into full consciousness. To do this is necessary because photography may 
then serve as a model for freedom in the post-industrial context. Thus, the 
task of a philosophy of photography is to show that there is no room for 
human freedom of photography is to show that there is no room for human 
freedom in the realm of the automated, programmed and programming 
apparatus; and having shown this, to argue how, despite apparatus, it is 
possible to create room for freedom. The task of a philosophy of 
photography is to analyze the possibility of freedom in a world dominated 
by apparatus; to think about how it is possible to give meaning to human 
life in the face of the accidental necessity of death. We need such a 
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philosophy because it is the last form of revolution which is still accessible 
for us.96 
 
 
In Postscript on the Societies of Control, Gilles Deleuze writes of a historical shift from 
societies of discipline, associated with Foucault, into decentralized societies of control. 
Control takes us away from spatial management and towards an ominous reality of 
distributed informational programming, just like Flusser describes. One wishes Deleuze 
had read Flusser prior to the essay, so that Deleuze’s language would be more precise. 
Deleuze’s essay, first published in 1992, shares Flusser’s near-messianic view of our 
current digital landscape – instead of our bodies being forced into a particular institution 
(of which prison is the best example), we are being constantly programmed: 
Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also 
continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long 
duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man 
enclosed, but man in debt… The conception of a control 
mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open 
environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or 
human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is not 
necessarily one of science fiction.97  
 
Today many young people even defend the NSA’s transgressions, claiming that they 
have done nothing wrong and so do not fear being spied on: they want to be controlled. 
They welcome it. They willingly sign up for more digital training in the forms of games 
and social networks that trivialize the spying process. Deleuze comments that “many 
young people strangely boast of being ‘motivated’; they re-request apprenticeships and 
permanent training. It’s up to them to discover what they’re being made to serve”98. 
                                                
96 Flusser. Towards a Philosophy 81. 
97 Deleuze, Gilles. Postscript 6. 
98 Deleuze, Gilles. Postscript 6. 
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Deleuze is clear: there is a new system of control that has emerged out of the apparatus, 
and it is the duty of young people to stand up against it.  
Deleuze sets up a call to arms here: his work in this essay is to present the (now) 
irrelevance of Foucault while calling upon these subsumed “young people” to be aware 
of and to stringently resist that control. Having passed the torch on, Deleuze is unclear as 
to what this resistance may look like, but it is abundantly clear that it must be resisted. I 
ask for a brief digression: Deleuze is extremely upfront about his shortcomings in the 
essay. Given a greater space for constructive narrative one ought to explore the meaning 
of a 5 page essay which announces a new, troubling age all the while absolutely refusing 
to interpret or react in a deliberate way against the fetters of that new age. How is it that 
academics are allowed this space? How is that academics are allowed an open, semi-
transparent space of discourse in which they are allowed to explore systemic landscapes 
all the while refusing to address their full-meaning and their own places within them? 
This is all to say: yes, there is a society of control that is evident to those who have kept a 
finger to the pulse of image (and therefore digital) culture. But what might the academic 
do about it? Can he do more than simply shine a light on it? Can an academic who 
attempts to do more even find a space to do so? Or is the academic destined (as we are 
often told) to complete, banished irrelevance which then grants his institutional advance. 
All of this to say: the time and mental bandwidth afforded academics allows them in turn 
to closely study social and institutional changes. That time and mental bandwidth, 
however, is acquired at the cost of doing the things necessary in order to advance in an 
institution, in other words, it is acquired at the cost of becoming institutionalized. Is 
he/she who is institutionalized capable of really resisting (in the mode of Deleuze and 
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Flusser)? Is it not a tiny bit unfair of Deleuze to ask a mythical “young people” to resist 
changes in a tide so massive and complicated that they require a philosopher in order to 
be found? Why should young people, in their own right, not turn the tables on the 
philosopher: why does the philosopher and the academic not resist? Is the philosopher 
and academic even capable of resisting?  
The unfairness of Deleuze’s question aside, we are left with his call to arms, 
which is unequivocal: control must be resisted – “there is no need to fear and hope, but 
only to look for new weapons”.99 What these weapons would look like, on the other hand, 
is hard to say. Since control is dispersed, resistance will not be against a space or 
particular institution, but against a logic and a program (two menacing subheadings of 
the essay). Control is decentralized because it is not a place like a school, but rather an 
ethic: control is what happens when people sit in front of their computers or thumb 
through their phone. This relationship to digital devices dialectically creates particular 
types of controlled subjects. Flusser calls these functionaries, whereas Deleuze calls them 
“dividuals.” Dividuation is a process of “dissolving individual identity into distributed 
networks of information,” much like what happens in contemporary society through the 
use of social networks, tracking websites, data auctions, etc. Everyone one comes in 
contact with computers, one is asked to become a little more computer-like – to think in 
terms of databases, networks, etc. Dividuation is also made clear through a comparison 
between factories and corporations. Factories, the worksite of discipline, have a clear 
geographical location, and have goals firmly rooted in space, whereas “the corporation is 
                                                
99 Deleuze. Postscript 4. 
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a spirit, a gas”.100 Clearly Deleuze is outlining the shapes of a world dictated by the 
digital. When we are treated as dividuals, there is a supreme form of alienation occurring: 
instead of being treated as ourselves, we are met as data. Information is, therefore, at the 
core of control. One obvious case of dividuation is the increasing simplification of 
expected discourse. Facebook, for instance, asks users to share (disperse) and like 
(approve), and very little else. This latter idea is easily quantifiable, being that it is binary 
(1/0). 
Resistance will have to be informational, or at the very least against the 
informational. More than likely it would also have to strike at the root of the devices that 
prop up the society of control. 
In a conversation with Antonio Negri titled Control and Becoming, Deleuze gave 
another hint: “the key thing may be to create vacuoles of non-communication, circuit 
breakers, so we can elude control.”101  How successful is a “circuit-breaker” to a 
distributed logic, however? Isn’t Deleuze’s vision of control somewhat simplistic, given 
Flusser’s more robust examination of the mechanisms of control? For instance: how do 
vacuoles of “non-communication” interact with the dialectical relationship between 
functionary and apparatus? How does one continue to explore particles without the use of 
an apparatus? Is Deleuze actually suggesting that people retreat into caves or mountains 
and completely exit modern existence? The answer is no; Deleuze’s suggestion is that we 
“short-circuit” control by creating broken routes through it feels like a mere pebble on the 
road. Were Deleuze aware of the mechanisms described by Flusser, he would know that 
                                                
100 Deleuze. Postscript 4. 
101 Deleuze, Gilles, and Antonio Negri. "Gilles Deleuze in Conversation with Antonio Negri." Generation 
Online. Futur Anterieur, Spring 1990. Web. 02 May 2016. 
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the problem is systemic, and not content based. Misinformation will do nothing when the 
problem comes from decentralized, ubiquitous apparatuses that create an ethic. There are 
obvious reasons to be dubious: does a circuit-breaker not assume the inner workings of 
control by necessity? Should resistance not be more systematic? We have the basics: 
resistance is necessary, should be informational, and it is against a dispersed program. 
Further, we are told that the work of resistance should be left to “young people.” What 
now? 
The answer is given to us by Flusser: be happy with the “celebration” that is 
sharing images into eternity, or commit suicide. The negative freedom of refusing to 
enter this world of cybernetic control should not be underestimated. In fact, it may soon 
become the only freedom we have left.  
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